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ABSTRACT
EFFECTS OF CONTEXT AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES ON MEMORY FOR
PRIOR REMEMBERING
Marcus L. Leppanen
July 13, 2018
Though people often remember experiences from their lives, they are also able to
remember whether a memory has previously been retrieved, which is known as memory
for prior remembering. Frequent failures of memory for prior remembering can have
negative consequences on how people perceive their own cognitive health. The
recurrence of traumatic memory retrieval can be interpreted as a consequence of intrusive
memory for prior remembering. This dissertation was conducted to improve our
understanding of the factors that influence the efficacy of memory for prior remembering.
The two factors that were investigated were context change and individual differences.
Participants (N = 180) completed a three-phase memory procedure. In the first phase,
participants learned a series of cue-target word pairs. In the second phase, participants
were given a cued-recall test (Test 1) for some of the pairs that they learned. Half of
those targets were tested in the same context as the learning phase (same-context targets)
and the other half were tested in a new context in which one feature had changed from
the learning phase (changed-context targets). Three different types of contextual features
could have changed in between-subjects fashion: the semantic context, background color
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context, or screen location context. In the third phase, participants were given a second
cued-recall test (Test 2) in which all of the learned targets were tested in the original
study context. During the third phase, participants were also asked to make a judgment
about whether each target was retrieved during Test 1. Results showed that memory for
prior remembering was only impaired for changed-context targets in the semantic change
condition. Participants also completed questionnaires to measure individual differences
in dispositional mindfulness and absorption. The only significant predictor of memory
for prior remembering was absorption and only in the semantic change condition. The
findings support a distinction between categorizing contextual features into local and
global categories based on their associations with memory for stimuli and memory for
prior remembering. Individual difference findings are discussed with respect to whether
attention is focused on internal thoughts or external stimuli. Future directions and
implications are also discussed.
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CHAPTER I
LITERATURE REVIEW
People not only remember the events of their lives, but also whether they have
recollected those events previously. In some instances, people also make judgments
about whether they have previously recollected a memory before or if they do not think
they have. The focus of this dissertation will be on one type of judgment that people
make, specifically when they decide whether or not they have previously remembered
something before, which will be referred to as their memory for prior remembering.
People are frequently asked to make judgments about their memory retrieval. For
example, people are often asked on clinical assessments how often they have retrieved
memories of traumatic events (e.g., the Clinician-Administered PTSD Scale for the
DSM-5; Weathers et al., 2013). Such assessments rest on the assumption that people can
accurately remember their own prior remembering. The accuracy of our memory for
prior remembering is also relevant to the debate over the validity of repressed, or
recovered, memories (e.g., Schooler, 2001). For those reasons, it is important to better
understand what affects the accuracy of memory for prior remembering. The specific
purpose of this dissertation was to explore factors that influence how well people
remember their own prior instances of memory retrieval and whether particular
individual differences are related to how accurately people judge their own prior
remembering to be.
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To test factors that influence memory for prior remembering a three-phase
memory procedure was adapted to address two important questions. The first question
was: What types of contextual features can be changed across instances of retrieval that
will lead to impaired memory for prior remembering? Currently, it is only known that
changes to semantic context (e.g., Arnold & Lindsay, 2002) and the method of retrieving
information (e.g., free recall versus recognition; Padilla-Walker & Poole, 2002) have
effects on the accuracy of memory for prior remembering. How those factors influence
memory for prior remembering will be discussed further in the Contextual Features and
Memory for Prior Remembering section of this dissertation. It has been proposed that
memory for prior remembering operates on the same principles as memory for stimuli.
As such, it should be possible to determine whether other types of contextual features
(e.g., background, location) that are associated with memory for stimuli are also
associated with memory for prior remembering. Because memories can be embedded in
a large number of contextual details, it is important to demonstrate whether any effects of
context change on memory for prior remembering can be generalized across multiple
kinds of context.
The second question was: Can individual differences in the accuracy of memory
for prior remembering be predicted by personality traits? People differ in the accuracy of
their memory for prior remembering, but the underlying causes of those differences
remain unknown. Understanding individual differences in memory for prior
remembering can lead to the development of theories about what causes some people to
have better memory for prior remembering than others. Differences in how people attend
to their own cognitions (e.g., acts of memory retrieval) may affect how well those
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cognitions are encoded into memory. Specifically, being mindful of, or absorbed in,
one’s cognitions could affect the accuracy of memory for prior remembering. The
research supporting why mindfulness and absorption were tested in this dissertation is
evaluated in greater detail in the Individual Differences and Memory for Prior
Remembering section.
The following sections form the body of the literature review and establish the
framework behind the design of this dissertation, the specific research questions, and my
research hypotheses. In the following section, I will discuss what memory for prior
remembering is and current theorizing about why people forget about prior acts of
memory retrieval. Then I will discuss the role that context plays in memory for stimuli
and memory for prior remembering. There will be specific discussions about the types of
contextual features I studied in this dissertation: background color and screen location.
At the end of the context section will be a re-statement of the first research question and
my hypotheses. Then the discussion will shift to individual differences in memory. That
section will begin with a general discussion of why individual differences are important
for memory research before narrowing to what is known about individual differences in
memory for prior remembering. There will then be specific sub-sections addressing the
individual differences of interest: dispositional mindfulness (Brown & Ryan, 2003) and
absorption (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974). The literature review will end with a discussion
of the hypotheses related to the individual difference measures.
Making Judgments about Prior Remembering
Memory for prior remembering is one type of metamemory judgment. In this
dissertation, the term metamemory refers to judgments that people can make about their
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own memory. Metamemory judgments can include predictive judgments of future
learning (e.g., Hartwig & Dunlosky, 2017), assessments of whether a memory was
previously retrieved or not (e.g., Arnold & Lindsay, 2002), or reports about the quality of
a recollection (e.g., Mickes, Seale-Carlisle, & Wixted, 2013). Memory for prior
remembering is a metamemory process that involves people making judgments about
whether they believe a piece of information they just retrieved was also retrieved at
another time in the past. Despite the fact that people frequently make judgments about
their prior remembering, researchers have questioned whether metamemory judgments
are accurate (e.g., Joslyn, Loftus, McNoughton, & Powers, 2001; Parks, 1999; Pope &
Hudson, 1995). Because of the malleable nature of memory and the potential for people
to incorporate misinformation into retrieved memories (see Loftus, 2005 for a review), it
is important to further understand what factors influence how accurate memory for prior
remembering is and why failures of memory for prior remembering occur.
The accuracy of memory for prior remembering has been of interest for over two
decades. Parks (1999) explored memory for previous instances of retrieving childhood
memories using a two-phase procedure. In the first phase, participants were brought into
the laboratory and asked to retrieve memories from their childhood in response to
prompts for specific types of events (e.g., “Do you remember your first bicycle?”). Later,
in the second phase, participants attempted to recollect some of the same events, as well
as new ones. During the second phase, participants were also asked to make judgments
about how recently they thought about the events they just recollected. Researchers have
demonstrated that participants frequently forget that they had retrieved specific memories
in the laboratory. Instead participants think that they had not retrieved those memories
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for weeks or years prior to the experiment. Participants can demonstrate that forgetting
when the two acts of retrieval are separated by only a few minutes within the same
experimental session (Parks, 1999) or when they are separated by as much as two weeks
(Merckelbach et al., 2006). Parks proposed that people have inaccurate memory for their
prior remembering because of a bias to underestimate how recently a memory has been
retrieved.
Schooler (2001) proposed that changes in subjective experience affect memory
for prior remembering. Schooler’s ideas came following interviews in which people
described an experience of forgetting that they previously retrieved a memory for a
highly emotional event, specifically instances of childhood sexual abuse. Schooler found
people who reported recovering their memories for a past experience of sexual abuse that
they believed they had never retrieved before. Despite their reports, evidence was found
that those people had previously recollected the abuse to a confidant and had forgotten
that previous act of recollection. Schooler posited that the subjective experience
associated with the recollection of a memory affects whether that act of recollection is
remembered later. The subjective experience of memory retrieval can be defined as the
emotional or conceptual interpretation of the memory at the time of retrieval. The
emotional and conceptual aspect of a memory may not remain the same over time and
changes to those types of interpretations are argued to impair memory for prior
remembering.
Schooler suggested that the surprise and distress that occurred from recollecting a
memory of abuse in a therapeutic setting was highly distinct from recollecting the same
memory with a confidant. People may have felt as though such an emotional response to
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a memory should itself be memorable. However, if the memory was previously
recollected in a calmer fashion, then that previous recollection may not be salient in the
context of the newer, highly emotional response to the more recent retrieval. In other
words, a highly emotional act of retrieving an experience of childhood sexual abuse could
be unlikely to remind someone that they had previously retrieved the memory before if
the previous recollection occurred in a less distressing fashion. Such different
experiences could lead a person to forget a prior instance of recollection. In extreme
cases, people may even claim to have entirely forgotten that an act of retrieval ever
occurred, which Schooler (2001) termed the “forgot-it-all-along effect.” The factors that
are currently known to affect the subjective experience of memories in a way that impairs
memory for prior remembering are discussed in the following section.
Contextual Features and Memory for Prior Remembering
The following section will address the first of two research questions: Are
contextual features other than semantic context associated with memory for prior
remembering? Research has demonstrated that changing semantic context impairs
memory for prior remembering (Arnold & Lindsay, 2002), but why is that important and
what does it tell us about human memory? In particular, this dissertation was designed to
test the theory that memory for prior remembering operates on the same principles as
memory for stimuli (Arnold & Lindsay, 2002; 2005). That theory is supported by
evidence that changes in semantic context affect both memory for prior remembering
(e.g., Arnold & Lindsay, 2002) and recognition accuracy (e.g., Tulving & Thomson,
1973). I will first discuss what is known about the relationship between semantic context
and memory for prior remembering. Then I will discuss current theorizing about the
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roles of subjective experience and encoding specificity in memory for prior remembering.
I will end the section by discussing the gap in the literature that can be filled by this
dissertation.
Arnold and Lindsay (2002) tested whether changes to semantic context could
create a change in subjective experience that would impair memory for prior
remembering. They tested that idea using a three-phase procedure. In the study phase of
Arnold and Lindsay’s paradigm, participants viewed semantically-related cue-target word
pairs (e.g., hand – palm, dog – bark). In each pair, the target was a homograph with two
meanings that were established by two distinct cue words (e.g., palm could refer to part
of your hand or a type of tree). Participants then completed a cued-recall test (referred to
as Test 1) for some of the studied words. Critically, some of the words were cued with
the same word from study (same-cue targets, e.g., hand – p _ _ m), others were cued with
a previously unseen word that was also related to a previously studied target (changedcue targets, e.g., birch – b _ _ k), and others were not tested at all during Test 1 (not
tested targets). This created a situation in which, during Test 1, the semantic context of
some of the targets changed, while it remained the same for others. Participants then
completed a second cued-recall test (referred to as Test 2) in which memory for all the
targets was tested in the original study context. Memory for prior remembering was
tested for each target during Test 2 by asking participants if the target they retrieved was
also retrieved during Test 1. It has consistently been found that memory for prior
remembering is worse when the context changes between Tests 1 and 2, compared to
when it remains the same throughout the experiment (Arnold & Lindsay, 2002; 2005;
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Geraerts et al., 2006; Leppanen & Lyle, 2018; Raymaekers, Peters, Smeets, Abidi, &
Merckelbach, 2011).
Context change is believed to affect memory for prior remembering because it is
assumed that memory for prior remembering follows the encoding specificity principle.
The encoding specificity principle states the ability to retrieve a memory is directly
related to the amount of overlap between the conditions that are present at retrieval and
those that were present at encoding (Tulving & Thomson, 1973). In the memory for prior
remembering paradigm, the act of retrieving a target during Test 1 is encoded with the
features that are present during that act of retrieval (e.g., the semantic context). Arnold
and Lindsay (2002; 2005) showed that remembering an act of retrieval is better when the
features present during Test 2 match those from Test 1 (same-context targets) and it is
impaired when they differ (changed-context targets). They argued that a change in
semantic context led participants to interpret the targets in subjectively different ways
across acts of retrieval (e.g., thinking about palm as part of your body is distinct from
thinking about palm as a type of tree).
According to the encoding specificity principle, a change in subjective experience
between acts of retrieval would make the Test 2 retrieval context unlikely to cue a
memory for the act of Test 1 retrieval. Even though the target remains the same between
Test 1 and Test 2, when the conditions surrounding the target change memory for prior
remembering is impaired. The subjective experience of a target differs following
changes in semantic context because the same word is interpreted in two distinct ways.
When the word palm is interpreted as being part of the body during Test 2, it would be a
poor cue for a previous instance of retrieving palm as a type of tree because of a violation
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of the encoding specificity principle. Such a distinction is not present for same-context
targets because it is assumed that no change in subjective experience occurs when the
semantic context remains the same across tests.
Further support for the role of encoding specificity in memory for prior
remembering comes from an experiment which explored the role of response format in
memory for prior remembering. Padilla-Walker and Poole (2002) had participants listen
to a list of recorded sentences that were all similar in structure (i.e., all of the sentences
included a subject, verb, and action). Following study, participants were asked to freely
recall as many sentences as they could. After participants heard a second list of distractor
sentences and completed other distractor tasks, they were either asked to freely recall as
many sentences from the first list as they could or were given a recognition test
containing all of the original sentences as well as novel sentences that were not heard in
the experiment. Following that second recall attempt, participants were also asked to
indicate whether they had retrieved the sentences during their first recall attempt or not.
Participants were more likely to falsely indicate that a sentence was not previously
retrieved following a recognition test than a second free recall test. The authors argued
that free recall tests and recognition tests may lead participants to think about the
information they are recalling differently.
Padilla-Walker and Poole’s (2002) argument supports Arnold and Lindsay’s
(2002) idea that memory for prior remembering operates on the same principles as
memory for stimuli. The way in which participants retrieve information affects both
memory for prior remembering (Padilla-Walker and Poole, 2002) and memory for stimuli
(e.g., the accuracy of eye witness memory reports; Evans & Fisher, 2011). In the
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memory for prior remembering paradigm, the response format can act as a to-beremembered cognitive operation and changes in how that operation is processed impair
memory for prior remembering. In contrast, the effect of response format on memory for
stimuli is on the amount and type of information that is offered (Evans & Fisher, 2011).
Despite supporting Arnold and Lindsay’s (2002) idea that changes in subjective
experience across tests can impair memory for prior remembering, Padilla-Walker and
Poole argued that future research could benefit by identifying what types of change can
cause participants to forget their previous recollections.
Other than understanding what factors impair memory for prior remembering,
attempts have also been made to determine whether the impairment caused by changes in
subjective experience can be alleviated. Leppanen and Lyle (2018) had participants
either retrieve or view study cues after retrieving targets during Test 1. In separate
experiments, participants were given one of three instructions: to overtly retrieve the
study cue paired with the previous target, to copy the study cue paired with a given target
after viewing it, or to overtly retrieve the study cue paired with the previous target while
being told whether that target was a changed-context target or a same-context target.
Leppanen and Lyle found that memory for prior remembering of changed-context targets
was equivalent to that of same-context targets when participants overtly retrieved study
cues, but not when they copied a presented study cue.
Leppanen and Lyle (2018) suggested that the benefit to memory for prior
remembering was the result of participants being reminded of the study context during
Test 1. They argued that being reminded of the previous context for a given target
allowed participants to associate the Test 1 retrieval context with the study context

10

(which subsequently became the Test 2 retrieval context). Such an association would
create a scenario in which the Test 1 retrieval context could be brought to mind by the
Test 2 retrieval context when it usually is not. While reminding benefited memory for
prior remembering of changed-context in all three experiments, the greatest improvement
in the accuracy of memory for prior remembering followed overt memory retrieval. The
difference in the efficacy between what was termed reminding-via-retrieval and
reminding-via-presentation was attributed to the benefit of retrieving information over restudying it (for a recent meta-analytic review, see Rowland, 2014). In previous studies,
participants were never asked to think about the study context during Test 1 (e.g., Arnold
& Lindsay, 2002), yet it is likely that some participants did. Leppanen and Lyle argued
that individual differences in what they termed “spontaneous reminding” could underlie
differences in memory for prior remembering. People who are more frequently reminded
of the context in which an experience occurred should be more likely to remember their
prior retrievals by having a greater number of associations with the act of memory
retrieval. Therefore, a second goal of this dissertation was to explore individual
differences in personality traits that could be associated with how people attend to their
own cognitions, which could influence levels of spontaneous reminding. Individual
differences in memory for prior remembering will be discussed in the Individual
Differences in Memory for Prior Remembering section.
The relationship between encoding specificity and memory for prior remembering
can be further elucidated if it is assumed that memory for cognitive operations generally
follows the same principles as memory for stimuli. Arnold and Lindsay (2005) argued
for that possibility by relating their findings to those of recognition failure paradigms
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(Tulving & Thomson, 1973). Recognition failure occurs when a target is cued with a
different word at study than at test and is subsequently endorsed as a new target, rather
than being recognized as old. Recognition failure is tied to the act of learning a specific
cue-target pairing, rather than any pre-experimental associations between a given cuetarget pairing. For example, when the word light is studied with the word head (a word
weakly-associated with light), it is typically easier to recall light when it is again
presented with head than it is to recognize light when it is paired with dark (a word
strongly-associated with light).
Memory for prior remembering and memory for stimuli are also similarly affected
differences in the detail of encoded information. Stimuli that are encoded with greater
detail, and subjectively experienced as more vivid, are remembered better than stimuli
that are encoded in less detail. For example, negatively valenced words have been shown
to be encoded in more detail than neutral words and were subsequently remembered
better (Kensinger & Corkin, 2003). Similarly, acts of recollection that are rated as more
vivid, have been shown to be more likely to be remembered than those that are rated as
less vivid (Merckelbach et al., 2006).
Despite what is currently known, it is my argument that prior research has yet to
fully support the assumption that memory for prior remembering operates on the same
principles as memory for stimuli. Arnold and Lindsay (2005, p. 547) stated that “[their]
findings suggest that remembering a prior episode of recollection is equivalent to
remembering other sorts of prior episodes. Hence, retrieval of evidence of prior
remembering follows the same principles that govern retrieval of evidence of other sorts
of episodic memories”. In other words, memory for prior remembering should follow all
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of the same principles as memory for stimuli. Currently, that argument is only supported
by evidence that changes in semantic context or retrieval method affect the accuracy of
memory for prior remembering and memory for stimuli. To provide more evidence for
whether memory for prior remembering follows the same principles as memory for
stimuli, other types of contextual features should be tested for associations with memory
for prior remembering.
Content versus Context of Memories
Before discussing the specific types of context that were used in this dissertation
to provide further support for Arnold and Lindsay’s (2002; 2005) ideas, it is necessary to
have a clearer understanding of what context is and why it is important for encoding
specificity. Memories are often separated into their content and context (e.g., Bookbinder
& Brainerd, 2016). Content refers to the to-be-remembered information (e.g., a word
pair, a picture, the topic of a conversation with a friend) and context is a broad term used
to describe aspects of the environment in which content learning takes place. For the
purposes of this dissertation, context is defined as the spatiotemporal (e.g., where and
when), perceptual (e.g., color), and internally generated (e.g., emotions) information that
is associated with a stimulus as it is being learned (Skinner & Fernandes, 2009). For
example, when students attend a lecture, the facts that are being learned in the lecture are
the content of their memory, but the classroom in which the lecture is taught is a
contextual feature that can later be associated with the topic of the lecture. The
association of context with content is important because it helps to distinguish highly
similar experiences with the same stimulus (for a similar interpretation of the role of
context, see Brinegar, Lehman, & Malmberg, 2013). As another example, you may have
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a memory of seeing a tiger at the zoo. That experience would be considered the content
of the memory in this example. The context surrounding that content could be the zoo
you were visiting, the weather that day, or how you felt about seeing the tiger. It is
possible that you have multiple experiences with seeing a tiger (e.g., in the zoo, in
photographs). You may have seen one tiger at the Louisville Zoo and another at the San
Diego Zoo. If someone asks you to recall your experience at the Louisville Zoo, you are
able to separate that experience from the memory about the San Diego Zoo because the
two experiences occurred in different contexts (e.g., locations).
In the literature, many different contextual features have been associated with the
accuracy of memory retrieval. When memory retrieval is impaired by changes to a
particular contextual feature, that finding can be used as evidence that the encoding
specificity principle generalizes across types of contextual features. For example, when
the physical location in which participants learn a list of words differs from the location
in which they are tested for those words, recall is typically impaired (e.g., Godden &
Baddeley, 1975). As mentioned previously, changing the semantic context of cue-target
word pairs between study and a recognition test impairs recognition accuracy (Tulving &
Thomson, 1973). Participants have been shown to have worse recall performance when
learning in an inebriated state and being tested sober than when learning and test occur in
the same state, whether the same state is inebriated or sober (Goodwin, Powell, Bremer,
Hoine, & Stern, 1969). When the emotional state that a person is in when they generate
autobiographical memories is the same as that on a subsequent test, memory for the
previously generated events is better than when the emotional state differs between acts
of retrieval (Eich, Macaulay, & Ryan, 1994). As can be seen from these examples,
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context can include many different features that, when changed, have an effect on the
ability to remember stimuli. Those effects are critical for extending the encoding
specificity principle to memory for prior remembering.
Many contextual features affect memory performance, but they are not all
considered to have the same relationship with the content of our memories. Different
features can have different effects depending on the paradigm being used. Changes in
location affect recall accuracy, but they are oftentimes found to have no effect on
recognition performance (e.g., Godden & Baddeley, 1980). Researchers account for
those types of disparities by grouping contextual features into categories with similar
relationships to memory content. It is impossible to discuss all possible methods of
categorization in this dissertation and, as such, only three predominant theories will be
briefly discussed. First, one proposed method of categorizing contextual features is to
use a local versus global categorization scheme (Dalton, 1993). Local contextual features
are those that are bound to one, or very few, items (e.g., semantic context) and global
contextual features are bound to many different items (e.g., locations, emotions). Second,
other researchers separate contextual features into verbal and environmental categories
(Franco-Watkins & Daugherty, 2006). Verbal context is applied to contextual features
that are described predominantly through the usage of words (i.e., equivalent to semantic
context) and environmental context refers to everything else about the learning
environment that does not require a verbal label to be processed (e.g., colors, locations).
Third, others use intrinsic and extrinsic labels for different types of contextual features
(Godden & Baddeley, 1980). Intrinsic contextual features of stimuli are perceived and
processed as a stimulus is being learned (e.g., semantic context, color), but extrinsic
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contextual features are often encoded incidentally (e.g., location). Based on the
categorization scheme being used, different predictions can be made for how different
features will be associated with memory content.
Arnold and Lindsay (2005) have endorsed the distinction between global and
local contextual features. They discussed how item-level (local) context had different
effects on memory for prior remembering than global contextual features have on output
monitoring (Marsh & Hicks, 2001). Output monitoring, like memory for prior
remembering, is a metamemory judgment about whether information has been
recollected previously. Output monitoring and memory for prior remembering are both
measured using three-phase procedures. A typical output monitoring procedure would
begin with blocks of two alternating phases. In the first of the two phases, participants
are given a list of words to remember. In the second phase, participants attempt to freely
recall the list they just studied. After a set number of lists, a third phase begins in which
participants are given the output monitoring recognition test. In the output monitoring
recognition test, participants must indicate which items were targets they had previously
retrieved, which were targets they had not retrieved, and which items were new. The
effects of global context on output monitoring have been assessed using Deese-RoedigerMcDermott (DRM) word lists (Roediger & McDermott, 1995). A DRM word list
includes semantically-related words (e.g., nurse, hospital, stethoscope) that all have high
associative strength with one extra-list word (e.g., doctor) that is never studied, known as
the critical lure. It has been shown that people have trouble accurately monitoring their
output of critical lures and often report previously retrieving critical lures, regardless of
whether they have or not (Marsh & Hicks, 2001).
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Arnold and Lindsay (2005) compared their findings to those of Marsh and Hicks
(2001) by arguing that item-level semantic context has different effects on memory for
prior remembering than global semantic context (established by DRM word lists) has on
output monitoring. Item-level contextual changes impaired memory for prior
remembering, but list-wide semantic context increased the endorsement of critical lures.
In both cases, metamemory judgments about prior retrieval are inaccurate. The important
distinction is that forgetting a prior instance of memory retrieval is an error of omission
and endorsing a non-retrieved critical lure as previously retrieved is an error of
commission. When local contextual features change there is forgetting of prior
remembering, but when items are learned in a consistent global context participants
appear to adopt a more liberal response criterion and instead endorse items as previously
remembered that were related to items they had actually remembered. It remains to be
tested how the two types of contextual features affect metamemory judgments using the
same paradigm. As such, aside from merely generalizing Arnold and Lindsay’s (2002)
findings to new types of contextual features, it is of interest to specifically test whether
changing global contextual features in the memory for prior remembering paradigm will
have the same impairing effect as changing local contextual features.
The present dissertation was designed to create a within-experiment comparison
between the effect of changing a local contextual feature (semantic context) and the
effects of changing global contextual features (background color and screen location) on
memory for prior remembering. It will be argued that changing background color and
screen location may also lead to distinct representations of cue-target pairs because both
features have previously been associated with memory for stimuli (as will be described
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next). If memory for prior remembering operates on the same principles as memory for
events, then such associations should also impact the accuracy of memory for prior
remembering. In particular when those features are changed there should be impaired
memory for prior remembering. Further, if memory for prior remembering follows the
encoding specificity principle, then the results of this dissertation would provide evidence
for whether background color and screen location affect the probability of Test 2 target
retrieval cueing Test 1 target retrieval.
Background Color Context Effects
The first contextual feature which was used to extend Arnold and Lindsay’s
(2002) findings was background color. The effects of background color on memory for
stimuli have been of interest to psychologists for nearly 90 years. The earliest
examinations looked at the effects of displaying target stimuli on colored cards.
Researchers have shown that cued-recall of cue-target pairs made up of nonsense
syllables was better when the color of the card on which pairs were presented remained
the same between study and test compared to when the background changed. That effect
was strongest when a given color was paired with only one cue-target pair (Dulsky,
1935). In other words, background color had the strongest association with the content of
a memory when it acted as a local contextual feature. Later research demonstrated that
participants took fewer trials to learn a set of cue-target word pairs when the pairs were
presented on colored cards compared to when the cue-target pairs were presented on
uniform gray backgrounds (Weiss & Margolious, 1954). Dulsky’s (1935) findings were
later extended from cued-recall to free recall by Isarida and Isarida (2007) who showed
that recall of Japanese characters was better for those which were tested on the same
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background they were studied on than those which were studied on a different color
background. Other researchers, however, have failed to find an association between
background color and memory for prose when only one color was used (Pointer & Bond,
1998).
It has been suggested that the effects of background color on memory are
determined by whether background color is encoded as a local contextual feature or a
global contextual feature (Sakai, Isarida, & Isarida, 2010). How background color is
encoded is likely determined by how many stimulus items are paired with a given color
and the frequency at which the color changes. Color could be encoded locally if few
items are paired with a given color and the color changes frequently, but color would
instead be encoded globally if many items are paired with the same color and the color
rarely changes. Despite the mixed findings of previous research, there is greater
empirical support for the idea that background color is in fact encoded with cue-target
word pairs. As such, changing background color between instances of retrieving cuetarget pairs may lead to distinct representations of the same target items and have an
effect on memory for prior remembering.
Screen Location Context Effects
The second contextual feature that was used in this dissertation was screen
location. Location is often studied as the physical environment in which learning occurs
(e.g., a classroom with a chalkboard, desks, and maps on the walls). It has frequently
been shown that changes in physical location between study and test impair memory
retrieval compared to when study and test occur in the same location (e.g., Godden &
Baddeley, 1975). Interestingly, a change in location can be used to reduce the
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interference that normally occurs when two word lists are learned back-to-back in the
same location (e.g., Brinegar, et al., 2013). Up to this point location has meant the
general spatial location in which information is being learned. However, location can
also refer to the relative location of a stimulus within the environment (e.g., the relative
location of items on a computer screen). For example, it has been shown that changing
the location of items that were learned in specific locations of a 4 x 4 grid on a computer
screen slows down recognition responses and lowers identification accuracy compared to
when the items remain in the same location (Murphy, Wynne, O’Rourke, Commins, &
Roche, 2009). It has also been shown that participants are able to use the position of a
stimulus on screen, irrespective of any other visual landmarks, as a retrieval cue to speed
responding when making judgments about whether an item was previously studied
(Wang, Johnson, Zhang, & Wang, 2002). Given these effects of screen location on
memory performance, it is plausible that the location on screen in which cue-target word
pairs are learned, and subsequently retrieved, will be associated with those word pairs
and have an effect on memory for prior remembering.
In conclusion, this section focused on context and the impact it has on memory.
Previous theorizing has suggested that memory for prior remembering operates on the
same principles as memory for stimuli and is similarly affected by contextual change
(e.g., Arnold & Lindsay, 2002). The predominant theoretical framework for researching
memory for prior remembering focuses on the encoding specificity principle. Yet, the
evidence supporting the theory that memory for prior remembering follows the encoding
specificity principle is limited. This dissertation was designed to address that gap in
understanding and to provide further support for the idea that memory for prior

20

remembering follows the encoding specificity principle. Specifically, background color
and screen location were used to test whether global contextual features have a similar
effect on memory for prior remembering as local contextual features.
Context Effect Hypotheses
As a reminder, the specific research question being asked is whether contextual
features other than semantic context are associated with the accuracy of memory for prior
remembering. To answer the proposed research question, the memory for prior
remembering paradigm used by Leppanen and Lyle (2018) was adapted to include
changes to different contextual features across Tests 1 and 2. In this paradigm,
participants studied cue-target pairings and were subsequently given two cued-recall tests
for the targets. Critically, during the second cued-recall test, participants were also asked
to make a judgment about whether they previously retrieved each target on Test 1. The
novel contribution of this dissertation was to compare the effects of changing semantic
context on memory for prior remembering and the effects of changing background color
and screen location. Those comparisons were made in a between-subjects fashion across
conditions in which only one contextual feature was changed between Test 1 and Test 2.
The to-be-remembered stimuli were equated across conditions by using the same cuetarget pairings. The dependent measure of interest was the accuracy of participants’
memory for their prior remembering. Full details of the procedure are provided in
Chapter II.
This design allowed for three between-condition comparisons on the effects of
contextual change on memory for prior remembering. Those comparisons were between
the effects of semantic context, background color context, and screen location context on
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memory for prior remembering. According to the encoding specificity principle and the
ideas of Arnold and Lindsay (2002), contextual features that are associated with memory
for stimuli should also be associated with memory for prior remembering. Therefore, it
was hypothesized that a similar pattern of results would be found across all three
conditions. Memory for prior remembering of same-context targets was expected to be
better than that of changed-context targets in all three conditions. Alternatively, it must
be acknowledged that changes to background color and screen location may not affect the
qualitative interpretation of the retrieved targets. Previous research suggests that
qualitative changes are required to impair the accuracy of memory for prior remembering
(e.g. Arnold & Lindsay, 2002; Schooler, 2001). If background color and screen location
do not affect the subjective experience of cue-target word pairs, then judgments of prior
remembering for changed-context targets would only be impaired in the semantic change
condition. It has also been suggested that local contextual features may have different
effects on memory for prior remembering than global contextual features (Arnold and
Lindsay, 2005). The distinction between local and global contextual features would be
supported by any finding that demonstrates the contextual features in this dissertation
have different effects on memory for prior remembering.
Individual Differences and Memory for Prior Remembering
The following section will address the second of the two research questions: Are
individual differences in internally-focused attention associated with the accuracy of
memory for prior remembering? Generally speaking, individual differences research
attempts to describe how the ways people differ affect behavior. As with any
measurement of cognitive performance, people differ in how accurately they remember
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previous instances of memory retrieval. Those differences in accuracy are likely to be
associated with individual differences in other measurable traits. However, which
individual differences are related to performance on the memory for prior remembering
task are poorly understood. This section will first focus on a general discussion of
individual differences research, before narrowing to some of the known individual
differences in memory. Then, the extent to which individual differences have been
associated with memory for prior remembering will be discussed. After that, the
discussion will focus on how internal processing of information may underlie
performance on the memory for prior remembering task. There will then will two
subsections which focus on the individual differences that were measured in this
dissertation – dispositional mindfulness and absorption – before ending with a summary
of the research hypotheses. Exploring which individual differences affect memory for
prior remembering will allow for a more informed discussion about the potential
cognitive mechanisms that underlie performance on the memory for prior remembering
task developed by Arnold and Lindsay (2002).
For the purposes of this dissertation, the discussion will focus on individual
differences that have been associated with memory. Individual differences in personality
traits (e.g., anxiety; Krans, de Bree, & Bryant, 2014), brain morphology (e.g.,
hippocampal volume; Maguire, Woollett, & Spiers, 2006), and cognitive abilities (e.g.,
working memory ability; Unsworth, Brewer, & Spillers, 2013) are just some of the
categories of individual differences which have been shown to affect memory for stimuli.
With so many individual differences associated with memory for stimuli, there are many
possible approaches to identifying the underlying processes that affect memory for prior
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remembering. Arnold and Lindsay (2002; 2005) proposed that memory for prior
remembering operates on the same principles as memory for stimuli. Therefore, if a
given individual difference is associated with memory for stimuli, it should also be
associated with memory for prior remembering.
To my knowledge, only one study has been conducted that attempted to measure
individual differences in memory for prior remembering. Raymaekers et al. (2011)
compared participants’ scores on a variety of questionnaires to their performance on the
memory for prior remembering paradigm developed by Arnold and Lindsay (2002).
Scores on the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ, Broadbent, Cooper, Fitzgerald, &
Parkes, 1982), the Creative Experiences Questionnaire (Merckelbach, Horselenberg, &
Muris, 2001), and the Dissociative Experiences Questionnaire (Bernstein & Putnam,
1986) were correlated with a single measure of memory for prior remembering
performance. In their experiment, memory for prior remembering was measured using a
difference score. As was stated in the introduction, there are two main dependent
variables in the memory for prior remembering paradigm: the proportions of same- and
changed-context targets correctly judged during Test 2 as having been previously
retrieved during Test 1. Raymaekers et al. (2011) subtracted the proportion of correct
judgments of prior remembering for changed-cue targets from that of same-cue targets.
Using the difference score, only one significant result was found. Scores on the CFQ
were negatively correlated with memory for prior remembering. The authors argued that
lower scores on the CFQ reflect a positive view of one’s own memory ability.
Participants who are low in self-reported cognitive failures may believe that if they had
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previously retrieved a target during Test 1 that they would clearly remember the
experience, because of their belief that they have good memory.
People who are low in cognitive failures could be likely to adopt a conservative
estimate of their prior remembering. Using a conservative response criterion, participants
could reject a changed-context target as being previously retrieved because they do not
have a strong memory for the prior recollection following the change in context. The
same pattern would not apply to same-context targets, which are already consistently
endorsed as previously retrieved. Such a pattern of conservative responding would lead
to a smaller difference score. Raymaekers and colleagues’ use of a difference score,
however, makes it impossible to properly interpret why difference scores are smaller in
those who endorse high amounts of cognitive failures.
The issue with Raymaekers et al. (2011) using a difference score is the reduction
of two dependent variables into one variable. Whether a particular difference is exhibited
in same-context or changed-context performance could have important implications for
the underlying mechanisms of memory for prior remembering. Currently, it is unknown
what the relationship is between scores on the CFQ and the different cue types that would
have led to smaller difference scores. The explanation given by Raymaekers et al. (2011)
suggests that response criteria underlie their findings. People are more or less likely to
endorse a previous memory as retrieved depending on how accurate they think their own
remembering is. People who report fewer cognitive failures may think that they are more
accurate. Because changed-context targets are often found to be endorsed as being
previously retrieved less often than same-context targets (e.g., Arnold & Lindsay, 2002;
Leppanen & Lyle, 2018), it would be informative to know how confidence in one’s own
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memory affects the different kinds of targets individually. Did participants who scored
high in cognitive failures have worse memory for prior remembering of same-context
targets or better memory for prior remembering of changed-context targets? Either
outcome would result in smaller difference scores, but would have distinct theoretical
interpretations. In one instance, there is a detriment to memory for prior remembering
that does not involve contextual shifts, while in the other there is an improvement in
memory for prior remembering despite contextual shifts. Even though the results from
the Raymaekers et al. (2011) experiment are difficult to interpret, they provide a
theoretical starting point for future research.
As discussed in the previous section, the underlying assumption of the present
dissertation is that memory for prior remembering follows the same principles as memory
for stimuli. In particular, memory for prior remembering has been shown to follow the
encoding specificity principle (Arnold & Lindsay, 2002; 2005; Padilla-Walker & Poole,
2002). It follows that individual differences which are associated with the encoding and
retrieval of stimuli should also be associated with the encoding and retrieval of a
cognitive operation like memory. Much like the ability to remember a stimulus, the
ability to remember an act of memory retrieval should be affected by the cognitive
processing that occurs during learning.
How deeply people process their own cognitions could potentially affect how well
they remember those cognitions. Some people may choose to think about their
cognitions deeply, but others may notice them and move on from them, and yet others
may actively try to suppress their own cognitions. It will be argued that these different
approaches have downstream effects on how well cognitions are remembered at a later
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point in time. I describe these preferences to process cognitions in distinct ways as types
of internal focus on cognition. Individual differences in internally-focused cognition
could be related to how people allocate their attention. The allocation of attention
directly affects memory. Greater attentional focus during learning improves later recall,
while divided attention leads to memory impairment (e.g., Baddeley, Lewis, Eldridge, &
Thomson, 1984). Attentional resources can be directed to cognitive processes or external
stimuli which could subsequently affect what types of information people choose to
elaborate on and subsequently remember.
As an example, say you have an interaction with your neighbor’s dog. During
that experience you may think back to previous experiences you had with that same dog,
to experiences you have had with the same breed of dog, or you may even think about an
experience you had with your mother’s cat (because dogs and cats are both types of pets).
All of those possibilities involve an internal focus on previous memories. However, if
you are focused on your current interaction with your neighbor’s dog you may not think
about any of those other experiences at all and the current interaction will be what you
focus on, which is instead a focus on external stimulation.
In the memory for prior remembering paradigm, people likely differ in how they
attend to Test 1 and the change in retrieval context. Participants who naturally attend to,
and elaborate on, the Test 1 retrieval context may come across an association with the
learning context and naturally form an association between the two. Such an association
is believed to benefit memory for prior remembering (Leppanen & Lyle, 2018). That
theory could be tested by inferring the extent to which individuals both attend to, and
elaborate on, their own cognitions using individual differences measures. Measuring
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individual differences in dispositional mindfulness (Brown & Ryan, 2003) and absorption
(Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974) would be appropriate because both traits are theorized to
involve differing levels of internal focus on cognition, which will be explained in greater
detail in the subsections to follow.
Whether focus is drawn to internal thoughts or to external stimulation can affect
how well an experience becomes integrated into our prior knowledge and the associations
that can be made to previous experiences. The integration of a new experience into prior
knowledge can occur through elaboration, which is a process that has been found to
benefit memory. The effects of elaboration are often studied using the levels-ofprocessing framework. Craik and Lockhart (1972) proposed the levels of processing
theory to account for research evidence that processing information deeply (e.g., thinking
about a word’s meaning) can lead to better memory for that information than shallow
processing (e.g., counting the number of vowels in a word). Similar evidence was found
in an experiment in which Warren, Hughes, and Tobias (1985) asked participants to
remember a list of adjectives. Participants who elaborated on the list of adjectives during
study (e.g., thinking about how the adjective relates to a specific memory) were found to
remember more of those adjectives than participants who merely rated the pleasantness of
the adjectives. The researchers argued that elaboration led to a larger network of
associations between the adjectives and previous autobiographical memories, which
increased the number of possible retrieval cues for the studied items.
It would be predicted that greater internal focus on an act of memory retrieval
would lead to more accurate memory for prior remembering. It could be that participants
who focus more on their internal cognitions will elaborate on them and thus create more
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associations between a given act of memory retrieval and other experiences from their
lives (or even within the experiment). Findings from our laboratory have shown that
being reminded of the learning context (which subsequently becomes the Test 2 retrieval
context) during Test 1 improves memory for prior remembering of changed-context
targets (Leppanen & Lyle, 2018). We argued that this improvement was the result of an
association being formed between the learning context, the Test 1 retrieval context, and
the target. Associating all three of those pieces of information would make the Test 2
retrieval context more likely to cue Test 1 target retrieval. Such an association could be
formed by elaborative processing and would be particularly beneficial for remembering
prior retrieval of changed-context targets. It could also be the case that deeper
elaboration of an act of retrieval simply leads to stronger learning of the act of memory
retrieval through extra-experimental associations, which could also lead to more accurate
memory for prior remembering.
It is also important to theorize about whether a lack of internal focus could harm
memory for prior remembering. It has been argued that mindful attention involves an
awareness of individual items of attention and the shifting of attention away from those
items prevents elaboration of the attended information (Bishop et al., 2004). In the
memory for prior remembering paradigm, participants who focus too much attention on
current retrieval contexts could be less likely to think about any other context in which
the stimuli may have been experienced (i.e., they may not think back to the study
context). If highly focused attention to individual items reduces elaboration of those
items, then participants with more focused attention would have less accurate memory for
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prior remembering in the face of contextual change where an ability to elaborate across
contexts is important.
As a reminder, the second research question being asked is whether individual
differences in internally-guided attention are associated with the accuracy of memory for
prior remembering. That question was explored by associating the accuracy of memory
for prior remembering with attention using two well-researched personality traits that are
related to memory and internally-guided attention: mindfulness and absorption. As will
be described next, both traits describe a person’s tendency to focus attention on presentmoment circumstances. Mindfulness involves the tendency for people to focus their
attention on sensations and feelings in a nonjudgmental manner (Kabat-Zinn, 2003),
which is different from how absorption involves a heightened focus and allocation of
perceptual resources on individual objects of attention (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974). The
following two subsections will focus the discussion on mindfulness and absorption
separately, but will involve similar argumentative structure. Each subsection will begin
with a general description of what mindfulness and absorption are. Then, evidence will
be provided that mindfulness and absorption are related to memory retrieval and
attention. That will be followed with a discussion of the theoretical associations between
a given trait and memory for prior remembering. After discussing both mindfulness and
absorption the section will end with a general summary and a description of the research
hypotheses.
Mindfulness
Mindfulness is a trait that has received considerable attention in the literature.
Mindfulness has been defined as a state of being attentive to and aware of current
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experience (Brown & Ryan, 2003) and as awareness of present-moment emotions and
state of mind (Kabat-Zinn, 2003). Mindfulness is often measured using self-report
questionnaires. Two of the most popular are the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale
(MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003) and the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ;
Baer et al., 2008). The MAAS measures awareness to the present moment with questions
that ask about the frequency of certain mindful experiences (Brown & Ryan, 2003),
whereas instead the FFMQ measures behaviors related to observing, describing, acting
with awareness, nonjudgment of inner experience, and nonreactivity to inner experience
(Baer et al., 2008). Using these questionnaires (and others), mindfulness has been shown
to have positive effects on both psychological (Brown & Ryan, 2003) and physical
(Monti et al., 2006) well-being. Some of the benefits of being mindful include:
reductions in anxiety and increased positive affect (Brown & Ryan, 2003), an improved
ability to cope with pain (Cioffi & Holloway, 1993), and an upregulation of the autoimmune response (Davidson et al., 2003).
Mindfulness may also lead to internally-focused attention that improves the
accuracy of memory for prior remembering. As a therapeutic technique, with overall
quality of life benefits, mindfulness is taught as a strategy which can be used to alter how
people focus their attention on their own thoughts and perceptions (Bishop et al., 2004).
Altering how people attend to their own thoughts is likely to have an effect on how well
they remember those thoughts. Attending to our cognitions and elaborating on them may
improve our ability to remember them.
Mindfulness has been argued to both promote and hinder elaboration. For
example, researchers have argued that mindfulness promotes non-judgmental elaboration,
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reduces response criterion, and widens access to our network of semantic knowledge
during retrieval (Rosenstreich, 2016). A widened semantic network would likely
counteract the impairment caused by changes in semantic context that typically impair
memory for prior remembering by allowing participants easier access to multiple
meanings of the target words. Participants with access to a wider semantic network
should more likely be cued to previous semantic contexts despite a change in context,
compared to participants with a smaller semantic network. According to prior theorizing
(e.g., Arnold & Lindsay, 2002), memory for prior remembering should not be impaired if
the retrieval context during Test 2 successfully cues that from Test 1. If that were the
case, then memory for prior remembering should be positively correlated with
dispositional mindfulness. Such a result would also support the claim that increased
focus on cognition is associated with better memory for prior remembering.
Conversely, mindfulness may instead hinder elaborative processing. Crawley
(2015) theorized that elaboration is affected by whether attention is focused on either
internal or external stimuli. Crawley mapped the two focuses of attention onto what are
known as the narrative self and the momentary self. The narrative self involves a focus
on internal thoughts and elaborations on them, while the momentary self instead involves
focusing on moment-to-moment experience without further elaboration. It has been
suggested that people naturally bias their attention internally on their narrative self.
Mindfulness training and trait mindfulness are both believed to shift that bias toward the
momentary self (Farb et al., 2007). Such a shift moves a person’s attention away from
internal thoughts to perceiving current experience, which may then inhibit elaborative
processing of that experience (Crawley, 2015).
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Therefore, people who are high in dispositional mindfulness may focus more on
perceiving current experience, which can include contextual information, than on their
thoughts about that experience. If that were the case, then changes in context would
likely be experienced as distinct and one context would be unlikely to cue memory for
another. In the current dissertation, if the retrieval context during Test 2 does not cue that
from Test 1, then memory for prior remembering should be impaired. Rather than a
benefit, mindfulness could instead have a negative association with memory for prior
remembering, or no association at all (since the default finding is that memory for prior
remembering is impaired by changes in context). The semantic change condition in the
present dissertation can be used to elucidate the effects that trait mindfulness has on
semantic elaboration. One goal of this dissertation was to explore whether memory for
prior remembering operates on similar principles to memory for stimuli and events.
Therefore, to better understand which outcome is predicted, it is necessary to understand
how mindfulness relates to other factors that affect memory.
There are two important ways in which mindfulness could indirectly impact
memory: mindfulness is associated with hippocampal morphology (e.g., size and shape)
and mindfulness improves attention. The former is important for understanding how
mindfulness affects brain areas that are important for memory formation and the latter
reflects why I will argue that mindfulness is a trait that can be associated with attention to
cognitions could underlie memory for prior remembering. The discussion will first focus
on the relationship between mindfulness and the hippocampus before shifting to
attention. Understanding effects on hippocampal morphology is important because the
hippocampus is the brain structure that is critically involved in the formation of long-term
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memories (Squire, 1992). People who practice mindfulness have been shown to have
greater gray matter volume in the right hippocampus compared to non-meditators (Hölzel
et al., 2008). It could be argued that the morphological changes in the hippocampus are
not associated with the practice of mindfulness meditation, per se, but rather that people
with larger hippocampi self-select into a mindful lifestyle. This is unlikely, given that
left hippocampal volume was found to be greater in a group of middle-aged adults that
completed an eight-week mindfulness-based stress reduction course compared to a
control group that did not practice meditation over the same period of time (Hölzel et al.,
2011). It has also been demonstrated that meditation alters the functional activation of
the hippocampus (Lazar et al., 2000). Given that mediation is a key component of
mindfulness training (Kabat-Zinn, 2003), it would follow that mindfulness training would
also affect hippocampal function in the short-term. These findings taken together suggest
that there are both short- and long-term associations between mindfulness and the
hippocampus.
A second factor that likely underlies the relationship between mindfulness and
memory performance is the association between mindfulness and attentional processes
(Jha, Krompinger, & Baime, 2007; Ruocco & Direkoglu, 2013). It is my argument that
attention plays a major role in how we process our own cognitions, which I believe then
underlies successful memory for prior remembering. In general, greater attention is
known to benefit memory performance (see Mulligan, 2008, for a review) and should
also benefit memory for prior remembering. Dispositional mindfulness may be one way
of testing that argument because it has been associated with improvements in attentional
processing (Ruocco & Direkoglu, 2013). It has also been shown that dispositional
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mindfulness is associated with better performance on a variety of attentional tasks. For
example, dispositional mindfulness, as measured by the MAAS, has been positively
correlated with measures of sustained attention on a GO/NOGO task (Mrazek,
Smallwood, & Schooler, 2012). GO/NOGO tasks require participants to respond to a
frequently occurring stimulus (e.g., the letter “O”) while inhibiting their response to an
infrequently occurring stimulus (e.g., the letter “Q”). It has also been shown that
mindfulness training improves performance on the emotional Stroop task, in which it is
typically more difficult to name the color in which a negative valenced word is written
than a neutral word. Improved performance on the emotional Stroop task suggests that
mindfulness is associated with heightened attention to primary task demands and that the
natural inhibition caused by our highly learned reading behavior becomes less distracting
(Lee & Orsillo, 2014).
In other cases, the association between mindfulness and attention is unclear.
Higher scores on the observing subscale of the FFMQ predict better alerting scores on the
Attention Networks Test and higher scores on the acting with awareness subscale predict
slower reaction times and worse orienting scores (Di Francesco, et al., 2017). Those
finding suggest that mindfulness can improve the ability to attend to external stimuli, but
at the cost of being able to shift attention quickly. That finding fits with Crawley’s
(2015) argument that mindfulness is associated with an external attentional bias.
However, some experiments have failed to find a relationship between a brief
mindfulness training session and performance on an n-back working memory task, or the
Trail Making Test. Both the n-back and Trail Making Task are considered to be
measures attentional processing (Johnson, Gur, David, & Currier, 2015). Given these
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relationships between mindfulness and attention, it is my argument that mindfulness can
be used as a measure of attentional processing that could predict the efficacy of memory
for prior remembering.
Despite the wide-ranging benefits of mindfulness on well-being and the
relationships between mindfulness and other factors associated with memory that were
just discussed, only recently have researchers begun to directly explore whether a
relationship exists between mindfulness and performance on memory tasks. These
explorations have typically taken one of two approaches: using mindfulness training
programs to directly examine effects of mindfulness on behavior and measuring
mindfulness as a dispositional trait that can underlie behavior without training. I will first
discuss findings relating mindfulness training to memory before discussing how
dispositional mindfulness relates to memory. Researchers have examined the
relationship between mindfulness training and memory using paradigms that vary in the
duration of training and the type of memory test being used. Mindfulness training often
involves teaching participants how to perform directed body scans. During a body scan,
participants’ attention is drawn to bodily sensations and current thoughts, with instruction
to withhold judgment on those perceptions (e.g., Bonamo, Legerski, & Thomas, 2015).
This type of mindfulness training can involve as few as three minutes of recorded
instructions, which has been shown to reduce false alarm rates on a recognition test,
relative to listening to a documentary for the same duration (Lloyd, Szani, Rubenstein,
Colgary, & Pereira-Pasarin, 2016). The frequency with which participants can freely
recall specific memories in response to emotional cue words on the Autobiographical
Memory Test (Williams & Broadbent, 1986) was found to increase from pre- to post-test
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following seven-weeks of a mindfulness training program compared to a
demographically-matched control group that underwent no training (Heeren, Van Broeck,
& Philippot, 2009). Memory specificity refers to whether or not individual experiences
can be reported in response to memory cues or if participants report general summaries of
past experiences. Specific memories are more detailed and contain more information
than general memories. Improved autobiographical memory specificity from pre- to
post-test was also found in a population of formerly depressed participants who
completed a mindfulness-based cognitive therapy program, while no improvement was
found in a non-depressed control sample (Williams, Teasdale, Segal, & Soulsby, 2000).
Mindfulness training has been shown to increase the proportion of remember
responses that are scored as hits in the remember/know paradigm and to improve recall of
information from a passage relative to a control condition (Brown, Goodman, Ryan, &
Anālayo, 2016; but see Watier & Dubois, 2016, for evidence that training did not affect
recognition accuracy). Brown et al.’s (2016) results have interesting implications for
how participants may perform on the memory for prior remembering task. In a
remember/know paradigm participants learn a set of stimuli, before being given a
recognition test. In addition to a recognition response, participants are also required to
make a judgment about whether they “remember” the stimuli (i.e., they can recall specific
details about the learning experience) or “know” that they learned the stimuli but do not
have extra details to support that judgment. It has been shown that recollection of
contextual details is highly concurrent with the use of remember responses (McCabe,
Geraci, Boman, Sensenig, & Rhodes, 2011). As such, the greater number of remember
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responses that participants give following mindfulness training seems to reflect better
memory for contextual details.
Mindfulness has also been related to with performance on tests of word recall.
Memory for Swahili-English word pairs was better following a brief mindfulness training
session that occurred immediately prior to recall than for a control group that was tested
immediately (Bonamo et al., 2015). Mindfulness training has also been shown to have
effects on emotionally-valenced word recall. Mindfulness training has been shown to
increase positive word recall from pre- to post-training (Roberts-Wolfe, Sacchet,
Hastings, Roth, & Britton, 2012) and others have found a lower proportion of negativelyvalenced word recall in a mindfulness training group relative to a control group (Alberts
& Thewissen, 2011). In both cases, there were no differences between groups in total
recall. It is important to note that mindfulness training can sometimes lead to increased
recall of false memories. Mindfulness training has been shown to increase the
endorsement of critical lures in the DRM paradigm relative to control groups in multiple
experiments (Rosenstreich, 2016; Wilson, Mickes, Stolarz-Fantino, Evrard, & Fantino,
2015).
Researchers have also examined the relationships between mindfulness as a
dispositional trait and memory. Dispositional mindfulness is defined as the tendency to
behave in a more or less mindful way in everyday life (Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007).
Researchers have looked for associations between dispositional mindfulness and memory
using mindfulness questionnaires like the MAAS and the FFMQ. In the Bonamo et al.
(2015) experiment, mentioned previously, no relationship was found between scores on
the FFMQ and recall performance, despite the beneficial effects that mindfulness training
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had on recall of English-Swahili word pairs. Other researchers have also failed to find a
relationship between scores on the FFMQ and memory. One such study explored how
dispositional mindfulness, measured using the FFMQ, was associated with recognition
memory. Rosenstreich and Ruderman (2016) compared participants’ hit rates to their
false alarm rates to assess the association between mindfulness and participants’ ability to
discriminate between new and old items. In a recognition memory experiment, a hit is a
correct identification of a previously studied item as old and a false alarm is an incorrect
identification of a new item as old. Rosenstreich and Ruderman (2016) used the term
sensitivity to describe their measure (though it was calculated the same way as
discrimination, d’), which they did not find to be associated with dispositional
mindfulness. Their results suggested that dispositional mindfulness does not improve
recognition memory performance. The lack of evidence to support a relationship
between dispositional mindfulness and memory is in stark contrast to the positive effects
that mindfulness training has on memory.
Other evidence suggests that the relationship between mindfulness and memory is
less clear. The experiment by Brown et al. (2016), which was mentioned previously,
failed to find a relationship between scores on the FFMQ and performance on the
remember/know paradigm, but did find a positive association between state mindfulness
(measured using the MAAS) and the proportion of remember responses that were scored
as hits. In other words, people who were in a mindful state (as a result of training or
assessment of current mental state) were shown to have better memory than those who
were not in a mindful state. Lykins, Baer, and Gottlieb (2012) found that long-term
mindfulness meditators had better recall performance on the California Verbal Learning
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Test (CVLT) than a non-meditating control sample. The CVLT is a word list recall test
which contains subscales for long- and short-delay retention intervals, as well as free and
cued-recall. Even though mindfulness meditators scored higher on the FFMQ than nonmeditators, no association was made between scores on the FFMQ and the CVLT.
Dispositional mindfulness, measured using the Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory (Walach,
Buchheld, Buttenmuller, Kleinknecht, & Schmidt, 2006), has been found to be negatively
correlated with autobiographical memory specificity (Crawley, 2015), but there was a
positive correlation between mindfulness and the intensity of emotional recall
experiences. The Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory measures mindful actions like
presence and acceptance, which are similar to the FFMQ measures of observing and
nonjudgment of thoughts and feelings, respectively.
Current research evidence suggests that the relationship between dispositional
mindfulness and memory needs to be better defined. In some cases dispositional
mindfulness has shown no relationship with memory, in others the relationship is
unknown (e.g., free recall, false memory endorsement), and others have found a positive
association. It is likely the case that how dispositional mindfulness is being measured
underlies any associations with memory. Though the FFMQ and the MAAS both purport
to measure mindfulness, the two measures focus on different aspects of the trait and there
is a critical distinction between the two. The MAAS focuses on the attentional aspects of
mindfulness, while the FFMQ measures mindfulness as a broad set of skills, of which
attention is only one aspect of mindfully acting with awareness. Because I am
specifically arguing that the role mindfulness plays in memory could be a product of
attentional focus, the MAAS was used. By using the MAAS, this dissertation sought to
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clarify the association between mindfulness and memory by exploring whether
dispositional levels of mindful attention are associated with cued-recall and memory for
prior remembering.
Based on the research that has been discussed, it is my argument that individual
differences in dispositional mindfulness could be used to measure internally-focused
attention on cognition. In particular, focusing on one’s own cognitions may improve
memory for prior remembering and that focus comes from attentional processing.
Focusing attention on either internal thoughts could lead to elaboration and an increase in
associations between a current cognition and previous experience. This is a novel
application of Crawley’s (2015) idea that dispositional mindfulness is related to
differences in internal and external attentional control. To find a relationship between
mindfulness and memory for prior remembering, it is important to use an appropriate
measure of mindfulness.
Currently there are competing theories concerning the relationship between
mindfulness and semantic elaboration and this dissertation can provide support for one
theory or the other. Finding that higher levels of mindfulness are associated with better
memory for prior remembering would support the theory that mindfulness can allow
people to have better access to their network of semantic information and, as a result,
better memory. Alternatively, finding that mindfulness has no association with memory
for prior remembering or is associated with greater impairment would support the theory
that mindfulness can manifest as greater external attention to present moment
circumstances and an inhibition of internal processing. I tested the association between
mindful attention and memory for prior remembering in each of the three conditions
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described in the previous section about context change (semantic change, background
change, and location change). Mindfulness was assessed using the MAAS, which was
given during the retention interval of the memory for prior remembering paradigm
adapted from Leppanen and Lyle (2018). To keep the discussion of predicted outcomes
for both of the individual difference measures clearer, hypotheses for how dispositional
mindfulness was expected to be associated with memory for prior remembering will be
discussed in the general summary section.
Absorption
The second individual difference factor that I argue could predict memory for
prior remembering is absorption (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974). Absorption is defined as
“a disposition for having episodes of ‘total’ attention that fully engage one’s
representational resources” and is most often measured using the Tellegen Absorption
Scale (TAS, Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974, p. 268). Measuring participants’ absorption will
allow me to further test my idea that individual differences in internally-focused
cognition affect memory for prior remembering. Absorption has received considerable
attention in the literature for its association with hypnotic susceptibility (e.g., Nadon,
Hoyt, Register, & Kihlstrom, 1991; Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974), but it has also been
associated with memory and attentional processes. Absorption has also frequently been
associated with other personality traits. People who score high on absorption measures
also tend to score high on tests of traits like fantasy proneness (see Lynn & Rhue, 1988
for a summary of findings), visual imagery and vividness of visual imagery (Pekala,
Wenger, & Levine, 1985), hypnotizability (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974), fantastical
thinking (Barret, 1996), procrastination (Sirois, 2014). Given the associations that
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absorption has with other traits that involve high levels of internal focus, it was measured
to assess whether internally-guided attention is associated with memory for prior
remembering.
Although mindfulness and absorption were both measured in this dissertation to
explore whether individual differences in how people focus on their own cognitions
affect memory for prior remembering, the two traits may reflect different types of focus.
Greater focus on one’s cognitions may lead to stronger memory for those cognitions. I
argued that mindfulness may play an important role in that process because of the
association mindfulness has with attention (e.g., Jha et al., 2007). Similarly, absorption
has been shown to be associated with attentional processes. People who score high in
absorption also score high on measures of self-focused attention (Perona-Garcelán, et al.,
2013), meaning they can become highly focused on themselves, rather than external
experiences. In contrast to highly-mindful individuals, people who are high in absorption
may focus their attention on elaborating about their own thoughts rather than noticing
them and letting them pass. Intense focus on cognitive processing could be why people
who are high in absorption are more susceptible to inattentional blindness (Richards,
Hellgren, & French, 2014), or the failure to notice a stimulus when a concurrent task also
demands attention. People who are high in absorption may have their behavior guided
less by external attention to stimuli and more by their own internal cognitions. Intense
focus on one’s cognitions could also be why absorption has been positively correlated
with procrastination (Sirois, 2014). Sirois conceptualized procrastination as a focus of
attention on present moment happiness with an avoidance of future thought, which
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suggests that absorption can manifest as focused attention on current experience without
respect to other points in time.
The results just presented support my argument that absorption is associated with
periods of highly-focused attention on internal thought, which could impact memory for
prior remembering. People who are highly absorbed in their current thoughts about a
given task may elaborate more on the stimuli that are being learned and relate them
previous experience. If that were the case, absorption would positively predict memory
for prior remembering. Participants who think a lot about changed-context targets may
come across the previous thoughts about those targets. It would then be more likely for
the Test 2 retrieval context to cue the Test 1 retrieval context and improve memory for
prior remembering. Alternatively, as with mindfulness, it could be the case that
absorption harms memory for prior remembering. Participants who are high in
absorption may instead focus on each individual retrieval context and focus deeply on
that specific information without thinking about it relates to their previous experience
during Test 1. In that situation, there would instead be a reduced likelihood that the Test
2 retrieval context would cue that from Test 1 and memory for prior remembering and
people who are high in absorption would show greater impairment than people who are
low in absorption. To have a better understanding of which outcome is more likely, the
discussion will now focus on the relationships that have already been found between
absorption and memory.
Associations between absorption and memory for stimuli can be used to develop
hypotheses about how absorption could affect memory for prior remembering. For
example, people who are high in absorption (as measured by the TAS in all of the
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following examples) have been shown to have a greater propensity to accept false
information about the peripheral details of a staged classroom event than people who are
low in absorption (Eisen & Carlson, 1998). It has also been shown that participants who
scored higher on absorption were more likely to have a distorted memory for how they
learned about a highly publicized event (i.e., the O.J. Simpson trial verdict). In the same
sample, no relationship was found between absorption and false retrieval of critical lures
on the DRM (Platt, Lacy, Iobst, and Finkelman, 1998). Those two findings suggest that
absorption could be associated with embellishing or otherwise accepting new details
about autobiographical events, but that same type of updating does not occur with verbal
stimuli in a laboratory setting. However, absorption has not always been associated with
more frequently reports of false memories. Participants who scored higher and those who
scored low in absorption were equally likely to falsely endorse journal entries that they
had not written as a previously retrieved memories (Horselenberg, Merckelbach, van
Breukelen, & Wessel, 2004). There is also no evidence to suggest that people who are
higher in absorption are more likely to create false memories for suggested childhood
experiences than participants lower in absorption (Hyman & Billings, 1998). These
results demonstrate that further research is needed to clarify the relationship between
absorption and false memories.
Absorption has also been associated with memory in people who have highlysuperior autobiographical memory (HSAM). People with HSAM have highly detailed
memories for autobiographical events. For example, they perform better than control
participants on the 10-dates questionnaire, which asks participants to recite which day of
the week a specific date fell on and to describe any verifiable, public event that would
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have occurred on that date (LePort et al., 2012). It has been proposed that people with
HSAM have such good memory because deeper attentional processing of, or absorption
in, events allows information to be related to oneself and people with HSAM engage in
that form of processing more than the average person (Patihis, 2016). In one study,
people with HSAM were found to have higher absorption scores than control participants
and people with HSAM were shown to have a higher propensity to accept misinformation
than control participants. In that study, controlling for absorption eliminated the
difference between people with HSAM and controls in their overall number of reported
false memories in a misinformation paradigm (Patihis et al., 2013). Despite having
highly accurate autobiographical memory, people with HSAM still attend to and accept
misinformation, much like the results of the previously discussed experiments with
participants who could be assumed to have average memory ability. Therefore, it seems
to be the case that regardless of baseline memory, people who are high in absorption are
more accepting of false information into memory.
Absorption has also been associated with memory distortions, which has
implications for how absorption may affect memory for prior remembering. A positive
correlation has been found between absorption and both the number and frequency of
memory distortions (Platt et al., 1998). This is relevant to memory for prior remembering
because one way in which memories can be distorted is through the acceptance of new
information (e.g., Belli, 1989). It could be the case that a memory distortion caused by
the acceptance of new information does not only cause memory distortions, but also
allows for new associations to be formed. This idea is relevant to the current discussion
because we found in our research that participants being reminded of the learning context
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during Test 1 improved their memory for prior remembering of changed-context targets
(Leppanen & Lyle, 2018). We argued that this was because reminding allowed
participants to form an association between the target, the learning context, and the Test 1
retrieval context. That association could only be formed if information about the learning
context was brought back to mind and added to the experience of the Test 1 retrieval
context.
Because reminding improves memory for prior remembering, it can be argued
that accepting new information into a recently retrieved memory has beneficial effects. If
people who are high in absorption are more likely to accept new information, then they
may also be more likely to accept a spontaneous reminder of a previous memory into a
new experience. In other words, participants who are high in absorption may be more
likely to incorporate the study context into their memory for the act of Test 1 retrieval,
regardless of a context change. What that would mean, is that for changed-context
targets, the Test 2 retrieval context (which is identical to the study context) would be
more likely to cue the Test 1 retrieval context and memory for prior remembering would
be improved.
This dissertation explored whether absorption can predict memory for prior
remembering. Even though previous researchers have frequently used the TAS, I used an
updated version of the TAS. The modified Tellegen Absorption Scale (MODTAS,
Jamieson, 2005) has stronger inter-scale correlations between the measure’s separate
subscales than the original TAS and all of the subscales were found to significantly load
onto one higher-order factor which represents absorption. Using the MODTAS allowed
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me to provide empirical support for whether highly-focused attention on internal thoughts
is associated with participants’ ability to remember prior instances of memory retrieval.
Conclusions
The previous three sections have discussed the impact of individual differences on
cognition, with an emphasis on memory and attentional processes. Currently, little is
known about individual differences in the accuracy of memory for prior remembering.
The individual differences that were measured in this dissertation were selected to
address my idea that individual differences in how people process their own cognitions
affect how well those cognitions are remembered. To date, researchers have only shown
that cognitive failures (as measured by the CFQ) are positively correlated with a
difference score that represents the accuracy of memory for prior remembering.
Throughout the previous two sections I have attempted to establish a connection between
individual differences that are associated with internally-guided attention and memory for
prior remembering. I have argued that attentional processes, which affect the encoding of
stimuli, also affect the encoding of instances of memory retrieval. It is also likely that
attention paid to cognitive processing can lead to elaboration of that processing which
can produce more associations between a given cognitive operation and previous
experience. In this dissertation internally-focused attention was measured as
dispositional mindfulness and absorption. Both dispositional mindfulness and absorption
have been found to have associations with memory and attentional processes. By relating
scores on the MAAS and the MODTAS to memory for prior remembering of both samecontext and changed-context targets, this dissertation will provide preliminary evidence
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for how attention to and elaboration on cognitions can affect later memory for those
cognitions.
The second research question of interest was whether individual differences in
internally-guided attention, which were measured using the MAAS and the MODTAS,
could predict memory for prior remembering. To answer that question, memory for prior
remembering was measured using an adapted version of paradigm used by Leppanen and
Lyle (2018). The proportion of correct judgments of prior remembering were related to
scores on the MAAS and the MODTAS. If you recall, in this paradigm, participants
studied cue-target pairings and were subsequently given two cued-recall tests for the
targets. Critically, after the second cued-recall test participants were asked to make
judgments about their prior remembering. Participants were required to indicate whether
they believed they retrieved each target during the first cued-recall test or not. Aside
from the context manipulations previously discussed, the second novel contribution of
this dissertation was to assess whether scores on the MAAS and the MODTAS could
predict memory for prior remembering. If any associations exist between internallyguided attention and memory for prior remembering, the design of this dissertation
allowed me to test whether any predictive power could be generalized across multiple
types of context (semantic, background color, and screen location) or whether predictive
power differs based on the type of contextual change.
Previous researchers have suggested that internally-guided attention can either
improve (Rosenstreich, 2016) or impair (Crawley, 2015) the elaboration of stimuli – at
least when theories focus on the attentional aspects of mindfulness – which could
subsequently affect how well Test 2 retrieval contexts cue Test 1 retrieval contexts. I
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hypothesized that memory for prior remembering would be negatively predicted by total
MAAS scores following all three types of contextual change. Previous research suggests
that participants who focus on present retrieval contexts without respect to past contexts
should show poorer memory for prior remembering of changed-context targets than
participants who focus more on their own cognitions. I also hypothesized that there will
be no association between dispositional mindfulness and memory for prior remembering
of same-context targets. Conversely, I hypothesized that memory for prior remembering
would be positively predicted by scores on the MODTAS in all three contextual change
conditions. If people who are absorbed attend to the stimuli they are learning on a deeper
level and relate those stimuli to previous experience, then they would be expected to have
access to a wider array of retrieval cues, which would be expected to improve memory
for prior remembering. Such a process would only be expected to benefit memory for
prior remembering of changed-context targets because memory for prior remembering of
same-context targets is typically near ceiling (e.g., Arnold & Lindsay, 2002; Leppanen &
Lyle, 2018). As such, I hypothesized that memory for prior remembering of samecontext targets would not be predicted by scores on the MODTAS in any condition. It is
also of interest whether mindfulness and absorption measure similar constructs or if the
two traits represent distinct ways of focusing on experience. As such, scores on the
MAAS and the MODTAS were correlated with one another. I hypothesized that scores
on the MAAS and the MODTAS would be positively correlated, given that an association
between scores on the original TAS and some subscales on the FFMQ has previously
been found (Grant et al., 2013).
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CHAPTER II
METHODS
Participants and Design
Undergraduate students (N = 180; 117 female; aged 18-30 years, M = 20)
participated for course credit. Sixty participants were in each of three conditions. All
participants completed the MAAS and the MODTAS. This dissertation had a 2 (Test 1
context: same versus changed) × 3 (Change type: semantic, background, location) mixedfactorial design, with Test 1 context as the between subjects factor and change type as the
within-subjects factor. Memory for prior remembering (measured as the proportion of
correct judgments of memory for prior remembering for same-context and changedcontext targets following in each change condition) was regressed on total scores on the
MAAS and total scores on the MODTAS to measure individual difference effects.
Materials
Study materials consisted of 113 homographic target words (selection criteria can
be found in Arnold & Lindsay, 2002). Four words served as primacy buffers and four
served as recency buffers, leaving 105 critical targets for analysis. Since each target was
a homograph, two possible cues were used which corresponded to two possible meanings
of the target (e.g., hand and tree were cues for the target palm). Study lists were created
by counterbalancing the pairing of each target with each of the two possible cues such
that each cue served as the study cue equally often across conditions. Test lists were
created by counterbalancing groups of 35 cue-target pairings into each of three Test 1
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treatments: tested with the same context as study (same-context targets), tested with the
other possible context (changed-context targets), and not tested. The counterbalancing of
test lists was based on assigning specific cue-target pairings from the study phase into
each treatment. This means that the type of change (semantic, background color, or
screen location) did not affect which cue-target pairings were assigned to which
treatment. For example, hand – palm was a studied cue-target pairing in the samecontext treatment, the other context treatment, and the not tested treatment an equal
amount of times, irrespective of what type of change occurred. Each target was tested in
the study context on Test 2, regardless of Test 1 treatment.
MAAS
Individual differences in dispositional mindfulness were measured using the
MAAS (Brown & Ryan, 2003). The MAAS is a 15-item questionnaire which asks
participants to rate how often they experience certain events, such as, “I find it difficult to
stay focused on what’s happening in the present”, on a 6-point Likert-type scale (1 =
Almost always to 6 = Almost Never). Ratings for all items were averaged together to
obtain a mindfulness score which could range from 1 to 6. Higher scores indicated
higher levels of dispositional mindfulness.
MODTAS
Individual differences in absorption were assessed using the MODTAS
(Jamieson, 2005). The MODTAS is a 34-item questionnaire which asks participants to
rate their agreement with a series of statements, such as, “When I listen to music, I get so
caught up in it that I don’t notice anything else”, on a 5-point Likert-type scale (0 = Never
to 4 = Very Often). To my knowledge, the precedent in the literature is to measure
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absorption as a single construct and not to analyze the individual subscales separately
(e.g., Horselenberg, et al., 2004; Platt et al., 1998; Sirois, 2014). As such, ratings for all
items were summed together to obtain a single absorption score. Scores could range
from 0 to 136, with higher scores indicating higher levels of absorption.
Procedure
The same three-step procedure, modeled after Arnold and Lindsay (2002), was
used for each type of contextual change. The first phase of the procedure was the study
phase. The second and third phases were both cued-recall tests, separated by a retention
interval. Each phase is described in more detail below.
Participants were tested in groups of up to five on individual computers in a
laboratory testing room using E-Prime 2.0 software. The procedure used in this
dissertation followed that of Leppanen and Lyle (2018), which differed from that of
Arnold and Lindsay (2002), in that participants completed the experiment individually on
a computer without an experimenter to record recall responses, nor was there auditory
recording of responses.
Study Phase
Following informed consent participants began the study phase of the experiment.
In each condition, participants read the same study instructions. Participants were asked
to attend to each cue-target pairing and learn that they go together. Participants were
instructed to study the series of cue-target word pairs because their memory for them
would be tested later. In the study phase, participants in all conditions viewed the same
105 critical cue-target word pairs (e.g., hand-palm, dog-bark), preceded by four primacy
buffers, and followed by four recency buffers. During the study phase, each
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homographic target was paired with one of two possible cues (e.g., palm could be cued
by either hand or tree). Critical cue-target pairs were presented in a new random order
for each participant. In the semantic change and background change conditions, each
study trial began with a cue-target pairing in the center of a white screen, in black font,
for 2000 ms. In the location change condition all of the study pairs were presented at the
top of the computer screen (centered, 10% below the top edge of the screen). Cue-target
pairs were then replaced with a sentence, in the same location as the cue-target pairing,
containing the cue word and three asterisks which represented the point in the sentence in
which the target would logically go (e.g., He used the *** of his hand to swat a fly, for
the target word palm). The sentence appeared on the screen alone for 3500 ms and then
the target word appeared above the sentence for an additional 1000 ms. As such, each
study trial lasted 6500 ms. Study trials were separated by a 1000 ms inter-trial interval.
Test 1 Phase
Immediately following the study phase, participants began the Test 1 phase. Test
1 was a self-paced, cued-recall test. For each Test 1 trial, a cue word and a partially
completed target, word consisting of the first and last letters of a studied target separated
by dashes (e.g., hand – p _ _ m), were presented on the screen. Participants were
instructed to type the entire target word rather than typing only the missing letters.
During Test 1, targets were assigned to one of three treatments: tested in the study
context (same-context targets), tested in a new context (changed-context targets), or not
tested (not tested targets). In the semantic change condition, same-context targets were
those that were paired with the study cue, while changed-context targets were those that
were paired with the other possible cue which was semantically-related to the target, but
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had not been studied previously. Unlike the semantic change condition, cue-target
pairings in the background and location change conditions remained the same throughout
the study. In the background change condition, same-context targets were presented in
black font on the same white background as the study phase, while changed-context
targets were presented in black font on a yellow background. In the location change
condition, same-context targets were presented at the top of the screen, while changedcontext targets were presented at the bottom of the screen (centered, 20% from the
bottom of the screen to allow for the response box to be located below the stimuli in both
treatments). Participants were instructed to respond with a target they remembered
viewing during the study phase and to respond with “pass” if they were unable to recall a
target from the study phase. Participants were given an example of how to respond. On
each trial, participants were given feedback on whether they were correct or incorrect.
There was a seven-minute retention interval following Test 1, during which time
participants completed the MAAS and the MODTAS. The order in which the two
questionnaires were completed was counterbalanced and achieved by stapling the
questionnaires in one of the two possible orders.
Test 2 Phase
Test 2 was a second cued-recall test. Participants were informed that all of the
words from the study phase would be tested in the same context they were viewed in
during the study phase (i.e., original study cues for all targets in the semantic change
condition, white background for all targets in the background change condition, and all
targets were presented at the top of the screen in the location change condition).
Participants were instructed to respond by typing in a target they remembered viewing
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during the study phase. Following each cued-recall attempt, participants were also asked
to make a judgment of their prior remembering. Participants were asked: “Did you
retrieve this target during the first test? Yes (y) or No (n)”. Participants were instructed
to make their judgment irrespective of the context in which the target appeared during
Test 1. If a participant remembered seeing “incorrect” as feedback after attempting to
retrieve a target on Test 1, or if they remembered responding with “pass”, they were
instructed to make the judgment that the target had not been previously retrieved. After
Test 2, participants were debriefed and dismissed.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Context Effect Analyses
The first aim of this dissertation was to test whether changing contextual features
other than the semantic context would impair memory for prior remembering. Even
though the focus of this dissertation is on accuracy of memory for prior remembering,
cued-recall performance was also analyzed (e.g., Arnold & Lindsay, 2002; Leppanen &
Lyle, 2018).
Context Effects on Cued Recall
Cued-recall performance on Test 1 was calculated as the proportion of correct
target retrievals (see Table 1). Performance was analyzed using a 2 (Test 1 context: same
or changed) × 3 (change type: semantic, background, location) mixed-factorial ANOVA,
with Test 1 context as the within-subjects variable and change type as the betweensubjects variable. The main effect of Test 1 context was significant, showing that cuedrecall of targets on Test 1 was greater for same-context targets (M = .79) than changedcontext targets (M = .75), F(1, 177) = 25.03, p < .001, ηp2 = .124. There was also a
significant main effect of change type, F(2, 177) = 7.02, p = .001, ηp2 = .074. Follow-up
independent samples t tests revealed that participants in the semantic change condition
recalled a significantly lower proportion of targets on Test 1 (M = .72) than participants
in the background change (M = .79) or the location change (M = .80) conditions, smallest
t(118) = 3.19, p = .002, d = 4.43. Test 1 cued-recall did not differ between the
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background or location change conditions. The main effects were qualified by a
significant interaction, F(2, 177) = 23.89, p < .001, ηp2 = .213. The interaction was
explored with follow-up paired-samples t tests for each change type separately. In the
semantic change condition, same-context target retrieval on Test 1 (M = .78) was
significantly better than changed-context target retrieval (M = .66), t(59) = 7.39, p < .001
, d = .974. In contrast, same-context target retrieval and changed-context target retrieval
on Test 1 did not differ in either the background change or location change condition,
smallest p = .910 (see Figure 1).
Table 1
Proportion of Targets Recalled Correctly Across Change Type
Change Type
Semantic
Background
Test 1 Same-Context
.78 (.02)
.79 (.02)
Test 1 Changed-Context
.66 (.02)
.79 (.02)
Test 2 Same-Context
.83 (.02)
.83 (.02)
Test 2 Changed-Context
.82 (.02)
.83 (.02)
Test 2 Not Tested
.80 (.02)
.80 (.02)
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors of the mean.
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Location
.80 (.02)
.80 (.02)
.84 (.02)
.84 (.02)
.79 (.02)

.95

Proportion Correct Test 1 Cued-Recall

.90
.85
.80
.75
.70
.65
.60

Semantic
Background
Location

.55
.50

Same Context

Changed Context

Test 1 Context

Figure 1. Proportion correct target recall on Test 1. Error bars represent one standard
error of the mean.
Cued-recall performance on Test 2 was calculated as the proportion of correct
target retrievals. The proportion of targets retrieved correctly was analyzed using a 3
(Test 1 context: same, changed, or not tested) × 3 (change type: semantic, background,
location) mixed-factorial ANOVA, with Test 1 context as a within-subjects factor and
change type as a between-subjects factor. The main effect of Test 1 context was
significant, F(2, 176) = 21.80, p < .001, ηp2 = .199. There was no significant interaction
between Test 1 context and change type (p = .666). The main effect of Test 1 context
was explored with follow-up paired-samples t tests comparing the proportion of correct
recall of same-, changed-, and not tested targets to each other across the three types of
change. Test 2 recall did not differ between same-context targets (M = .83) and changed-
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context targets (M = .83), but not tested targets (M = .79) were recalled significantly less
often than either previously tested cue type, smallest t(179) = 5.55, p < .001, d = .32 (see
Figure 2).
.95
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Figure 2. Proportion correct target recall on Test 2. Error bars represent one standard
error of the mean.

Context Effects on Memory for Prior Remembering
Memory for prior remembering analyses were run contingent upon correct target
retrieval on both Test 1 and Test 2 (e.g., Arnold & Lindsay, 2002; Leppanen & Lyle,
2018). Accurate memory for prior remembering was defined as a “yes” judgment to the
memory for prior remembering probe following cued-recall attempts on Test 2 (“Did you
retrieve this target on the first test?”). Tables 2-4 show the proportion (and raw number)
of targets judged to have been previously retrieved on Test 1 in response to the memory
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for prior remembering probe on Test 2. The proportion of correct judgments of memory
for prior remembering was analyzed using a 2 (Test 1 context: same or changed) X 3
(change type: semantic, background, location) mixed-factorial ANOVA, with Test 1
context as a within-subjects factor and change type as a between-subjects factor. The
main effect of Test 1 context (see Figure 3) was significant, F(1, 177) = 85.20, p < .001,
ηp2 = .325. A follow-up paired-samples t test revealed that the accuracy of memory for
prior remembering of same-context targets (M = .91) was significantly higher than that of
changed-context targets (M = .82), t(179) = 6.50, p < .001, d = .48. However, this main
effect was qualified by a significant interaction with change type, F(2, 177) = 91.97, p <
.001, ηp2 = .510. To explore the interaction, separate paired-samples t tests were run for
each change type separately (semantic, background, location). In the semantic change
condition, accuracy of memory for prior remembering of same-context targets (M = .91)
was significantly higher than that of changed-context targets (M = .63), t(59) = 10.33, p <
.001, d = 1.47. In the background change condition, accuracy of memory for prior
remembering of same-context targets (M = .92) did not significantly differ from that of
changed-context targets (M = .91), p = .124. In the location change condition, the pattern
of results was opposite that of the semantic change condition. Accuracy of memory for
prior remembering of changed-context targets (M = .92) was significantly higher than
that of same-context targets (M = .90), t(59) = 2.00, p = .05, d = .22.
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Table 2
Mean Number of Targets and Mean Proportion of Targets Judged as “recalled” as a
Function of Recall Status on Test 1 for the Semantic Change Condition

Test 1/Test 2
Recall Status

Number of
Targets

Proportion Judged as
“recalled” on Test 1

Recalled/Recalled
Recalled/Not Recalled
Not Recalled/Not Recalled
Not Recalled/Recalled

Same cue*
26.27
1.15
4.93
2.65

.91 (.01)
.61 (.07)
.22 (.04)
.53 (.06)

Changed cue*
Recalled/Recalled
Recalled/Not Recalled
Not Recalled/Not Recalled
Not Recalled/Recalled

20.25
2.78
3.43
8.43

.63 (.03)
.33 (.06)
.21 (.04)
.37 (.05)

Not tested*
NA/Recalled
27.88
.36 (.04)
NA/Not Recalled
7.12
.15 (.03)
NA = Not applicable. * Test 1 context. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors of the
mean. Lines in bold are those for which statistical analyses are reported in the text.
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Table 3
Mean Number of Targets and Mean Proportion of Targets Judged as “recalled” as a
Function of Recall Status on Test 1 for the Background Change Condition

Test 1/Test 2
Recall Status

Number of
Targets

Proportion Judged as
“recalled” on Test 1

Recalled/Recalled
Recalled/Not Recalled
Not Recalled/Not Recalled
Not Recalled/Recalled

Same cue*
26.57
1.18
4.73
2.52

.92 (.01)
.66 (.07)
.28 (.05)
.53 (.05)

Changed cue*
Recalled/Recalled
Recalled/Not Recalled
Not Recalled/Not Recalled
Not Recalled/Recalled

26.68
1.03
4.90
2.38

.91 (.01)
.52 (.08)
.27 (.05)
.55 (.06)

Not tested*
NA/Recalled
27.83
.34 (.04)
NA/Not Recalled
7.17
.15 (.03)
NA = Not applicable. * Test 1 context. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors of the
mean. Lines in bold are those for which statistical analyses are reported in the text.
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Table 4
Mean Number of Targets and Mean Proportion of Targets Judged as “recalled” as a
Function of Recall Status on Test 1 for the Location Change Condition

Test 1/Test 2
Recall Status

Number of
Targets

Proportion Judged as
“recalled” on Test 1

Recalled/Recalled
Recalled/Not Recalled
Not Recalled/Not Recalled
Not Recalled/Recalled

Same cue*
26.90
1.05
4.60
2.45

.90 (.01)
.55 (.07)
.21 (.04)
.44 (.05)

Changed cue*
Recalled/Recalled
Recalled/Not Recalled
Not Recalled/Not Recalled
Not Recalled/Recalled

26.83
1.07
4.63
2.47

.92 (.01)
.56 (.07)
.23 (.04)
.54 (.05)

Not tested*
NA/Recalled
27.63
.34 (.04)
NA/Not Recalled
7.37
.13 (.03)
NA = Not applicable. * Test 1 context. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors of the
mean. Lines in bold are those for which statistical analyses are reported in the text.
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Figure 3. Proportion correct judgments of memory for prior remembering across the three
change types. Judgments were only analyzed for targets which were correctly retrieved
on both Test 1 and Test 2. Errors bars represent one standard error of the mean.
I also examined if the accuracy of memory for prior remembering of changedcontext targets differed between the three change types. Independent-samples t tests
revealed that accuracy of memory for prior remembering of changed-context targets was
significantly worse following a change in semantic context (M = .63), than following
either of the other two change types (Ms = .91 and .92, for the background change and
location change conditions, respectively), smallest t(118) = 8.04, p < .001, d = 1.52.
Accuracy of memory for prior remembering of changed-context targets did not
significantly differ between the background change and location change conditions, p =
.372.
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Individual Difference Analyses
The second aim of this dissertation was to explore if dispositional mindfulness
and absorption could predict memory for prior remembering. Neither scores on the
MAAS, nor scores on the MODTAS differed as a function of questionnaire order,
smallest p = .293, and as such, all analyses were collapsed across order. The correlation
between scores on the MAAS (M = 53.3) and scores on the MODTAS (M = 60.8) did not
reach the cutoff of statistical significance, r = -.14, p = .063.
Correlations between Cued Recall, Memory for Prior Remembering, scores on the
MAAS, and scores on the MODTAS
Pearson’s correlations were calculated between the individual difference measures
(MAAS and MODTAS scores) and the dependent variables. From Test 1, the proportion
of correct same- and changed-context target retrieval were included. From Test 2, the
proportion of correct same- and changed-context target retrieval, and the proportion of
correct not tested target retrieval were included. The proportion of correct judgments of
memory for prior remembering for same- and changed-context targets were also
included. Finally, a contextual change difference score was added to the correlation
analyses. Contextual change difference scores were calculated by subtracting the
proportion of correct judgments of memory for prior remembering for changed-context
targets from that of same-context targets. Contextual change difference scores were
added to assess the effect of contextual change on memory for prior remembering while
accounting for baseline memory performance. Full correlation matrices can be found in
the in Tables 5-7.
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Across all three types of change, an expected positive correlation was found
between all of the cued-recall measures, smallest r = .35, p = .007. The only significant
correlation between cued-recall and memory for prior remembering was found in the
background color condition. In the background condition, the proportion of changedcontext targets that were retrieved on Test 1 was negatively correlated with the contextual
change difference score, r = -.27, p = .041. There were also significant positive
correlations between the proportion of correct judgments of memory for prior
remembering for same- and changed-context targets in all three conditions, smallest r =
.61, p < .001. The only significant correlations between the individual difference
measures and accuracy of memory for prior remembering were found in the semantic
change condition. In the semantic change condition, there was a significant positive
correlation between MODTAS scores and the proportion of correct memory for prior
remembering judgments of same-context targets, r = .29, p = .026. There was also a
significant positive correlation between MODTAS scores and the proportion of correct
memory for prior remembering judgments of changed-context targets, r = .27, p = .035.
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Table 5
Correlation Matrix for the Semantic Change Condition
Correlations
Variable

1

1 Total MAAS

–

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
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2 Total MODTAS

.05

–

3 Test 1 Same-Context
Cued Recall
4 Test 1 ChangedContext Cued Recall
5 Test 2 Same-Context
Cued Recall
6 Test 2 ChangedContext Cued Recall
7 Test 2 Not Tested
Cued Recall
8 Same-context MPR

-.11

-.12

–

.07

-.06

.47***

-.18

.09

.85*** .42***

-.12

.01

.66*** .46*** .69***

-.32*

.14

.57***

.35**

.06

.29*

.13

.02

.24

.09

.07

–

.07

.27*

.01

-.04

.05

-.11

-.09

.61***

–

-.06

-.20

.05

.05

.04

.17

.14

-.30*

-.94***

9 Changed-Context
MPR
10 Contextual Change
Difference Score

10

–
–
–

.69*** .78***

–

Note: MPR = proportion correct judgments of memory for prior remembering. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

–

Table 6
Correlation Matrix for the Background Color Change Condition
Correlations
Variable

1

1 Total MAAS

–

2

3

4

5
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2 Total MODTAS

-.31

–

3 Test 1 Same-Context
Cued Recall
4 Test 1 ChangedContext Cued Recall
5 Test 2 Same-Context
Cued Recall
6 Test 2 ChangedContext Cued Recall
7 Test 2 Not Tested
Cued Recall
8 Same-context MPR

.06

-.08

–

-.06

-.11

.73***

-.06

-.10

.90*** .72***

.01

-.12

.66*** .89*** .69***

.05

-.27* .72***

9 Changed-Context
MPR
10 Contextual Change
Difference Score

6

7

8

9

10

–

.75**

–
–

.74*** .74***

–

-.05

.07

-.04

-.2

-.08

-.18

-.23

–

-.11

-.03

.08

< .01

.06

.06

-.06

.73***

–

.08

.14

-.17

-.27*

-.19

-.31*

-.21

.28*

-.46***

Note: MPR = proportion correct judgments of memory for prior remembering. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

–

Table 7
Correlation Matrix for the Screen Location Change Condition
Correlations
Variable

1

1 Total MAAS

–

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
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2 Total MODTAS

-.14

–

3 Test 1 Same-Context
Cued Recall
4 Test 1 ChangedContext Cued Recall
5 Test 2 Same-Context
Cued Recall
6 Test 2 ChangedContext Cued Recall
7 Test 2 Not Tested
Cued Recall
8 Same-context MPR

-.02

-.22

–

.04

-.20

.75***

–

.09

-.16

.91***

.77***

–

.11

-.17

.70***

.92***

.76***

–

.10

-.13

.73***

.76**

.79***

.78***

–

.10

.06

.14

.01

.12

-.04

.09

–

.12

.07

-.02

-.03

< .01

-.08

-.08

.66***

–

< -.01

< .01

.20

.05

.16

.04

.20

.50*

-.32***

9 Changed-Context
MPR
10 Contextual Change
Difference Score

Note: MPR = proportion correct judgments of memory for prior remembering. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

10

–

Predictive Power of the MAAS and the MODTAS on Cued-Recall Performance
For each type of change (semantic, background, location), seven multiple linear
regression analyses were run. Separate multiple linear regressions were run to predict
Test 1 cued-recall performance (total, same-context, and changed-context) and Test 2
cued-recall performance (total, same-context, changed-context, not tested). Each
multiple linear regression analysis consisted of two steps. In the first step, scores on the
MAAS and scores on the MODTAS were entered as predictor variables, in stepwise
fashion, with a significance cutoff of p = .05 for inclusion in the model. In the second
step, an interaction term (calculated by mean-centering each participant’s MAAS and
MODTAS scores before multiplying them together) was entered, in a stepwise fashion,
with a significance cutoff of p = .05 for inclusion in the model. In the semantic change
condition, cued-recall of not tested targets on Test 2 was significantly predicted by
MAAS scores (see Table 8), F(1, 59) = 6.57, p = .013. In the background change
condition, cued-recall of not tested targets on Test 2 was significantly predicted by
MODTAS scores (see Table 9), F(1, 59) = 4.63, p = .036. No other regressions revealed
significant predictors of cued-recall performance.
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Table 8
Multiple Linear Regression Results When Predicting Cued Recall of Not Tested Targets
on Test 2 Following a Change in Semantic Context

Predictor

β

R2

t

p

MAAS

-.003

.102

-2.56

.013

MODTAS

--

--

1.28

.203

MAAS x
MODTAS

--

--

-.57

.569

Table 9
Multiple Linear Regression Results When Predicting Cued Recall of Not Tested Targets
on Test 2 Following a Change in Background Context

Predictor

β

R2

t

p

MODTAS

-.001

.074

-2.15

.036

MAAS

--

--

-.29

.772

MAAS x
MODTAS

--

--

-.05

.963

Predictive Power of the MAAS and the MODTAS on Memory for Prior Remembering
For each condition (semantic change, background change, location change), three
multiple linear regression analyses were run. Separate multiple linear regressions were
run to predict the proportion of correct memory for prior remembering judgments for
same-context targets, the proportion of correct memory for prior remembering judgments
for changed-context targets, and contextual change difference scores. Each multiple
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linear regression analysis consisted of two steps. In the first step, scores on the MAAS
and scores on the MODTAS were entered as predictor variables, in stepwise fashion,
with a significance cutoff of p = .05 for inclusion in the model. In the second step, an
interaction term (calculated by mean-centering each participant’s MAAS and MODTAS
scores before multiplying them together) was entered, in stepwise fashion, with a
significance cutoff of p = .05 for inclusion in the model. The only significant predictors
were found in the semantic change condition. Scores on the MODTAS significantly
predicted accuracy of memory for prior remembering judgments for same-context targets,
F(1, 59) = 5.21, R2 = .082, p = .026, and changed-context targets, F(1, 59) = 4.66, R2 =
.074, p = .035. Tables 10 and 11 display the beta weights, R2 values, t statistic, and
significance for the models with significant predictors. Scores on the MODTAS, scores
on the MAAS, and their interaction term did not significantly predict contextual change
difference scores in the semantic change condition.
Table 10
Multiple Linear Regression Results When Predicting Same-context Memory for Prior
Remembering in the Semantic Context Condition

Predictor

β

R2

t

p

MODTAS

.001

.082

2.28

.026

MAAS

--

--

.36

.719

MAAS x
MODTAS

--

--

.81

.423
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Table 11
Multiple Linear Regression Results When Predicting Changed-context Memory for Prior
Remembering in the Semantic Change Condition

Predictor

β

R2

t

p

MODTAS

.003

.074

2.16

.035

MAAS

--

--

.47

.641

MAAS x
MODTAS

--

--

.65

.518
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this dissertation was to explore factors affecting memory for prior
remembering. Specifically, two factors that influence the accuracy of memory for prior
remembering were explored by adapting a paradigm that was originally developed by
Arnold and Lindsay (2002) and later used by Leppanen and Lyle (2018). The two factors
were context change and individual differences. The discussion will first focus on the
findings related to context change before moving on to a discussion of the individual
differences findings.
Context and Memory for Prior Remembering
First, three different context changes were examined to test what types of
contextual changes affect memory for prior remembering. The effects of changing
semantic, background, and screen location contexts on the accuracy of memory for prior
remembering were compared. I hypothesized that changing any contextual feature
between instances of memory retrieval would impair memory for prior remembering of
changed-context targets. Participants learned a series of cue-target pairs and were asked
to retrieve them twice. On Test 1, participants retrieved targets in one of two contexts.
In the same-context condition, cued-recall occurred in the same context throughout the
course of the experiment. In other words, the cue, background color, or location on
screen of same-context targets never changed. In the changed-context condition, cuedrecall occurred with one contextual feature being different (e.g., the cue changed in the
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semantic condition) between Test 1 and Test 2. Consistent with previous research (e.g.,
Arnold & Lindsay, 2002; Leppanen & Lyle, 2018), changing the semantic context in
which targets were retrieved impaired memory for prior remembering. In contrast, there
was no impairment caused by changes in background color context or screen location
context. In fact, memory for prior remembering improved following a change in screen
location.
This dissertation tested Arnold and Lindsay’s (2002; 2005) idea that memory for
cognitive operations (e.g., an act of memory retrieval) operates on the same principles as
memory for stimuli. The current findings provided support for the idea that specific
types of context change affect memory for stimuli and memory for prior remembering in
the same fashion. Cued-recall of changed-context targets on Test 1 was worse than that
of same-context targets in the semantic change condition, but not in the background color
or location change conditions. A similar pattern was found when examining memory for
prior remembering. The difference was that memory for prior remembering of changedcontext targets was improved by a change in screen location rather than being unaffected
by the change. Therefore, it was shown that recall of targets and recall of previous acts
of retrieval were similarly affected or unaffected by changes to specific types of
contextual features.
As was discussed in the introduction, researchers have suggested that contextual
features can be categorized based on their associations with performance in different
memory paradigms (e.g., cued-recall versus recognition). One such categorization
scheme separates contextual features into local and global feature categories (Dalton,
1993). Local contextual features are those that are associated with one, or very few items
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in memory (e.g., the semantic condition in this dissertation), whereas global contextual
features can be associated with many items in memory (e.g., the background and location
conditions). Previous research has shown that changing local contextual features
between study and retrieval is associated with contextual change effects (e.g., Dalton,
1993). A contextual change effect is found when memory retrieval is impaired by
retrieving an item in a different context than it was studied in. Conversely, changing
global contextual features between study and retrieval has inconsistent effects on memory
retrieval (e.g., Smith, 1986). For example, changing the physical location between study
and test impairs free recall performance, but not recognition performance (Godden &
Baddeley, 1980). The present results suggest that contextual features should be separated
into local and global categories when discussing effects of context change on memory for
prior remembering. The present dissertation utilized semantic context as an example of a
local contextual feature, whereas both background color and screen location acted as
global contextual features. Changing a local contextual feature had an impairing effect
on both cued-recall and memory for prior remembering, but changing global contextual
features had inconsistent effects. Cued-recall was not impaired by changing background
color or screen location of the cue-target pairs, while memory for prior remembering was
not affected by a change in background color and was improved by a change in screen
location.
The results may also be interpreted as a demonstration that changes to memory
content impair memory for prior remembering, but changes to context do not. Why may
that be the case? When you see the word bark, you may think about how that word
represents the sound a dog makes or part of a tree. Under those circumstances, the
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meaning of the words could be interpreted as the stimulus being learned, rather than as a
contextual feature. At no point in this dissertation were participants asked to make the
background color or the visual location of a stimulus the to-be-remembered information.
Rather, they were instructed that the information would be present during retrieval.
While semantic context is more focal to the stimuli being learned, I would nonetheless
contend that the changes in this dissertation were to semantic context and not the content
of the stimuli being learned. Franco-Watkins and Dougherty (2006) defined semantic
context as one word acting as the context for another word. In this dissertation,
participants learned homographic targets, which means each target could have multiple
words that act as appropriate context. That is a critical feature of the design because
participants were tested on whether they had seen particular orthographic forms during
the study phase and word meaning is not necessary to complete that task. Without any
semantic information acting as a retrieval context during Test 1 or Test 2, participants
could still complete the cued-recall tests with the letters of a word they saw during the
study phase. So while it may seem as though the semantic information is necessary for
successful cued-recall performance, the task can also be completed without it. Semantic
information is likely to make retrieving orthographic forms easier, but that benefit is
derived from an association between the orthographic form of the stimulus (i.e., the
content) and the semantic context of that stimulus.
Background color may have had no effects on cued-recall or memory for prior
remembering because of how global contextual features become associated with the
content of memories. I hypothesized that changing the background color would impair
memory performance, given that alternating two background colors paired with verbal
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stimuli has been shown to lead to context effects (Isarida & Isarida, 2007). However, that
hypothesis was not supported by the present results. Neither cued-recall nor memory for
prior remembering were impaired by a change in background color. It may be that too
many targets were paired with the same color context, which could have led to cue
overload (Rutherford, 2004). Cue overload can occur when a specific contextual feature
no longer serves as an effective retrieval cue because many stimulus items are paired with
that same context. Cue overload has been shown with as few as 20 items paired with one
background color context (Isarida & Isarida, 2007). This dissertation paired 35 items
during Test 1 with either the white background context or the yellow background context,
which could have led to cue overload and the background color becoming an
uninformative retrieval cue. If background color became irrelevant, then participants
may have habituated to that particular feature and no longer attended to it (e.g., Turatto,
Bonetti, & Pascucci, 2017; Wagner, 1979). Habituation occurs when a stimulus that
previously elicited a response from an organism ceases to do so. If participants became
habituated to the yellow background, they would no longer process it and it would no
longer be associated with the cue-target pairs. If the background color was never
associated with the cue-target pairs during Test 1, then Test 1 and Test 2 would have had
identical retrieval contexts. Under those circumstances, changed-context targets would
have been treated identically to same-context targets and memory for prior remembering
would not be impaired. That result was exactly what was found.
Although cue overload and habituation can account for the null effect of
background change on memory for prior remembering, it is less clear why changing the
screen location improved memory for prior remembering in this dissertation. Although
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the effect was numerically small (a difference in accuracy of less than 2 percent), it was
unexpected and bears consideration. One possibility is that participants encoded the
oculomotor response that they made to cue-target pairs at the bottom of the screen as an
action that was associated with particular cue-target pairs. Participants would then have
had access to a greater number of retrieval cues for changed-context targets than samecontext targets when making their memory for prior remembering judgments. In the
same-context condition, cue-target pairs remained at the top of the screen (where they
would have been expected to be up to that point in the experiment) and, as such, no
additional oculomotor movements needed to be made to process the test pair. However,
in the changed-context condition, participants needed to actively shift their gaze to the
bottom of the screen, adding an additional action that could subsequently be remembered.
This idea could be tested using eye-tracking methodology to see if participants shift their
gaze to the bottom of the screen during retrieval of changed-context targets during Test 2,
despite the target no longer being presented there.
Researchers have suggested that oculomotor responses are implicitly encoded as a
type of spatial cue that can improve recognition memory (Bradley, Cuthbert, & Lang,
1988). Bradley et al. (1988) demonstrated that participants recognize words embedded in
a string of digits faster when the oculomotor response made while viewing the stimuli is
the same between study and test compared to when it differs, but with no benefit to
accuracy. It has also been shown that participants make saccades to empty areas of a
computer screen where a visual stimulus was previously paired with auditory
presentation of factual information when retrieving a memory for the fact which was
heard (Richardson & Spivey, 2000). Despite such a response, a reinstated oculomotor
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response did not benefit recall accuracy compared to trials in which no saccades were
made to the previous location of the visual stimulus. Previous findings suggest that
oculomotor responses can be implicitly encoded along with memory for a stimulus, but
the binding of an oculomotor response to a stimulus does not benefit later retrieval of that
stimulus. Currently it is unknown whether implicitly-encoded oculomotor responses are
associated with memory for prior remembering. It would instead be advantageous to
focus on the lack of any impairment caused by the change in screen location, which may
have been caused by cue overload, as suggested previously for the background change
condition.
The likelihood that participants would endorse non-retrieved changed-context
targets as previously retrieved differed across the three contextual change conditions (Not
recalled/Recalled in Tables 2-4). In the semantic change condition, relative to the
background and location change conditions, participants were less likely to endorse
changed-context targets they had just retrieved on Test 2 as also having been retrieved on
Test 1. This finding could be related to differences in the subjective experience of
retrieving targets across different contexts, as suggested by Arnold and Lindsay (2002).
Participants in the semantic change condition had subjectively different experiences when
retrieving changed-context targets on Test 1 compared to when they attempted to retrieve
them again in the original context on Test 2. The change in subjective experience is
believed to reduce the likelihood that the Test 2 retrieval context cues a memory for Test
1.
The results of this dissertation suggest that those in the background and location
change conditions did not process any difference in subjective experience across tests,
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regardless of the Test 1 context. That means that Test 2 would be more likely to cue a
memory for Test 1, which could result in targets feeling like they were retrieved before
when they were really cued but not retrieved. A stronger feeling of experiencing a target
during Test 1 could then result in the endorsement of the target as being previously
retrieved, when it fact it was not. However, in the semantic change condition, regardless
of whether a participant successfully or unsuccessfully retrieved a target on Test 1, a
change in subjective experience between the two tests would mean that the Test 2
retrieval context would be unlikely to cue a memory for Test 1 at all. That means that
successful recall of a target on Test 2 would not cue participants to Test 1 as often,
regardless of Test 1 retrieval success. This argument is supported by the finding that, in
the semantic change condition, the endorsement of same-context targets that were not
previously retrieved on Test 1 as retrieved was higher than that of changed-context
targets. The endorsement of a not previously retrieved target as retrieved was essentially
equivalent between same-context targets in the semantic change condition and that of
changed-context targets in the background and location change conditions. Under those
three circumstances, the subjective experiences of Test 1 and Test 2 were likely similar
and it was under those circumstances that merely being cued to retrieve a target was most
likely to be misconstrued as successful retrieval.
The argument that subjective experience has an impact on memory for prior
remembering is also supported by the finding that there was no difference between the
three conditions in the endorsement of not tested targets as previously retrieved. As
discussed, participants may partially make their memory for prior remembering
judgments based on whether they believe they were cued for a given target during Test 1.
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Participants could have been more likely to have that belief when Test 2 felt subjectively
the same as Test 1. For participants in the background and location change conditions,
compared to those in the semantic change condition, the Test 2 retrieval context was
more likely to cue a memory for both retrieval success and failure during Test 1.
Therefore, a difference in subjective experience was more likely to affect responding in
the semantic condition than in the background or location conditions. Such an effect of
subjective experience could only be found with targets that participants attempted to
retrieve on Test 1. That is exactly what was found in this dissertation. A change in
context between Test 1 and Test 2 only affected memory for prior remembering
judgments when there was an act of retrieval to be cued in the first place. For not tested
targets, there could be no association between those targets and any previous retrieval
context, which would result in a similar subjective experience of those targets regardless
of any context change.
Individual Differences in Memory for Prior Remembering
The second factor that was explored in the present dissertation was individual
differences. The specific question was whether dispositional mindfulness and absorption
could be found to predict the accuracy of participants’ memory for prior remembering.
Using multiple regression analyses, it was found that scores on the MODTAS
significantly predicted the accuracy of memory for prior remembering of both same- and
changed-context targets, but only in the semantic change condition. Higher absorption
scores were associated with better memory for prior remembering. In contrast, scores on
the MAAS were not found to predict the accuracy of memory for prior remembering in
any condition.
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There was some predictive power of absorption on memory performance, but that
predictive power was specific to few circumstances. Following a change in semantic
context, absorption significantly predicted memory for prior remembering of both sameand changed-context targets. However, absorption did not generally predict memory
performance. If absorption provided an overall mnemonic benefit, then it should have
significantly predicted performance across all of the memory measures in this dissertation
(i.e., cued-recall and memory for prior remembering across all three types of change).
Instead, absorption did not predict the accuracy of memory for prior remembering in the
background or location change conditions. In fact, the only other measure significantly
predicted by absorption was cued-recall of not tested targets in the background change
condition.
Given that combination of findings, the predictive power of absorption may be
specific to experimental task demands. In the semantic change condition, the task
requires that participants process the same targets with two different meanings, designed
to create two distinct ways to subjectively experience each target. Participants who are
high in absorption may notice the difficulty of the task and shift their focus to thinking
deeply about each target to try and remember how they thought about it. That shift in
attention could lead participants to elaborate on what a given target means, which could
coincidentally bring the original study context to mind (which later becomes the Test 2
retrieval context). Under those circumstances, an association could be formed between
the study context and the act of retrieval during Test 1, reducing the disparity in
subjective experience between the two meanings of a word by associating them together.
That association could then be brought to mind during Test 2 and memory for prior
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remembering would be improved. In contrast, there may be no subjective difference
between same- and changed-context targets on Test 1 in the background and location
conditions. In those conditions, participants who were high in absorption may not have
experienced any task demands that would influence the focus of their attention on
anything other than the immediate retrieval of targets. The present results suggest that
people who are high in absorption are better able to remember their internal cognitions,
but they do not differ in their ability to remember external events. Furthermore,
absorption may only benefit memory for internal cognitions in situations in which
attention is drawn to internal processing.
Previous research has found mindfulness to be associated with better memory
(e.g., Bonamo et al., 2015; Roberts-Wolfe et al., 2012), but the findings of this
dissertation are inconsistent with that pattern. In this dissertation mindfulness only
significantly predicted cued-recall of not tested targets following a change in screen
location. Previous research has found that mindfulness training benefits cued-recall of
Swahili-English word pairs (Bonamo et al., 2015) but dispositional mindfulness did not
predict cued-recall of same- or changed-context targets on either Test 1 or Test 2 in this
dissertation. The beneficial effects of mindfulness on memory have been generalized to
recognition memory (e.g., Lloyd et al., 2016) and free recall of specific autobiographical
details (Heeren et al., 2009), but they did not generalize to memory for prior
remembering. Mindfulness may not have predicted memory for prior remembering
because of a reduction in elaborative processing (Crawley, 2015). Typically, memory
benefits from elaborating on a stimulus and creating stronger associations between that
stimulus and other experiences (Craik & Tulving, 1975). As such, it would be expected
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that memory for prior remembering should benefit from elaboration (specifically,
elaboration on internal cognitive processing), as well. Elaborating on the cue-target pairs
during Test 1 would be expected to create more associative links between the act of
memory retrieval and previous experience. Increasing the number of associations with
the act of Test 1 cued-recall should increase the likelihood that a memory for Test 1 is
retrieved later. Because mindfulness practice is designed to teach people to notice
internal thoughts and feelings before moving on from them (e.g., Kabat-Zinn, 2003)
people who are naturally mindful may not spend much time elaborating on their own
thoughts. It may also be the case that mindful attention is related to the amount of effort
needed to complete a task (Jensen, Vangkilde, Frokjaer, & Hasselbalch, 2012) and the
conditions in the present dissertation may not have required more mindful participants to
fully utilize their attentional resources. Participants who are more mindful would attend
to their internal cognitions, but may devote less effort to their attending to those
cognitions which would reduce the likelihood of any elaboration on those cognitions. In
such a situation, mindfulness would not be expected to benefit memory for prior
remembering, but it would not cause impairment either. The present results do not
support previous findings that mindfulness has general benefits to memory performance
because mindfulness did not have an effect on memory for prior remembering.
Effects of absorption and mindfulness on cued-recall performance were less clear.
Both absorption and mindfulness predicted Test 2 cued-recall of not tested targets, but in
different conditions. Absorption predicted Test 2 cued-recall of not tested targets in the
background change condition, whereas mindfulness predicted Test 2 cued-recall of not
tested targets in the semantic change condition. It could be the case that, under some
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circumstances, participants who focus on the stimuli that they are recalling during Test 1
will create stronger memories for those targets. Later, on Test 2, those stronger
memories may interfere with the weaker memory for targets which had not been seen
since the study phase. It is unclear, however, why that interference would occur in some
conditions and not others.
The results of the present dissertation suggest that absorption and mindfulness are
separable constructs. In the introduction, I proposed that both traits represent a person’s
ability to focus on internal states and thoughts. People who are high in absorption spend
their time engrossed in their thoughts and fantasies. In contrast, people who are high in
mindfulness focus their attention on bodily sensations and thoughts in a non-judgmental
manner before moving on from them. Despite the similar emphasis on internally-focused
attention, the two traits seem to represent different forms of attentional processing that
affect memory differently.
Mindfulness and absorption were not significantly correlated and were found to
have different relationships with memory for prior remembering. It could be that people
who are high in absorption and those who are high in mindfulness process information
differently with respect to the self. People who are high in absorption may process their
thoughts and fantasies in a way that allows them to integrate previous experience into
those thoughts more readily. In contrast, people who are high in mindfulness will
acknowledge the thoughts and fantasies they are having, but instead pass on from them
without integrating previous experiences into those thoughts. In that way, people who
are mindful will experience thoughts and feelings moment-to-moment, while people who
are high in absorption will experience them as a unified whole that is integrated with
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other thoughts and fantasies over time. Such a difference in how people process
cognitions could underlie the disparate findings in whether mindfulness and absorption
could be used to predict memory for prior remembering. Deeper processing of an act of
memory retrieval and elaborating on how it relates to other experiences would likely
increase the number of previous experiences associated with that act of retrieval, which
would increase the number of available retrieval cues and result in improved memory for
prior remembering.
People who are high in absorption may be more likely to be spontaneously
reminded of previous contexts when retrieving a memory. Leppanen and Lyle (2018)
suggested that higher rates of spontaneous reminding should lead to improved memory
for prior remembering. People who are high in absorption are argued to think more about
the information they are remembering. While thinking about a given target, someone
who is high in absorption could be more likely to spontaneously think about the study
context and be better able to associate that context with the Test 1 retrieval context. It
could also be the case that people who are high in absorption are spontaneously reminded
of the background color and screen location in which cue-target pairs were previously
seen. However, because memory for prior remembering in the background color and
screen location conditions was near ceiling, there was reduced variability across all
participants. Reduced variability inherently makes it more difficult to find individual
differences in performance, which could explain why no individual differences were
found in either the background color or screen location conditions. Future research
should be conducted to see whether people who are high in absorption are better able to
remember the study cue of changed-context targets. Given that successful retrieval of
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study cues during Test 1 has beneficial effects on memory for prior remembering
(Leppanen & Lyle, 2018), absorption may benefit memory for prior remembering
because those who are high in absorption are better able to retrieve the study cue for
changed-context targets.
Although not the main focus of this dissertation, it is of note that evidence of a
testing effect on cued-recall was found. A testing effect is found when practice retrieving
information benefits later retrieval of that same information (Karpicke & Roediger,
2008). In all three change conditions of the present dissertation, Test 2 cued-recall of
same- and changed-context targets was greater than that of not tested targets. In other
words, participants were better at retrieving targets on Test 2 that they had successfully
retrieved on Test 1 than targets they had not attempted to retrieve before. This is further
evidence that memory retrieval itself is a process that has mnemonic benefits for later
retrieval of the same information.
Future Directions and Implications
Because people frequently make judgments about their memory for prior
remembering, future research should be conducted that further explores the factors that
underlie successful memory for prior remembering. Memory for prior remembering is
known to be affected by contextual information and individual differences in personality
traits. Future research could determine how context change and individual differences
affect memory for prior remembering across the lifespan. It has been shown that older
adults have poorer memory for contextual information than younger adults (e.g., Burke &
Light, 1981). As such, I would predict that older adults have worse memory for prior
remembering than younger adults. Replicating the current dissertation in a sample of
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older adults could demonstrate whether memory for prior remembering operates on the
same principles across the lifespan. Do local and global contextual features have similar
effects on memory for prior remembering in older adults as they do in younger adults? If
older adults exhibit a similar pattern to younger adults, then despite overall poorer
memory for prior remembering, changes in semantic context (local context) should be
more impairing than changes to either background color or screen location context
(global contexts).
Studying memory for prior remembering also has implications for improving our
understanding of cognitive aging. Older adults are known to have greater difficult
processing contextual information than younger adults (e.g., Chee et al., 2006) and it is
known that context plays an important role in memory for prior remembering (e.g.,
Arnold & Lindsay, 2002). As such, an impaired ability to remember prior remembering
could be used as a marker for cognitive aging and lead to the development of cognitive
interventions that could help mitigate declines in memory function.
Given that mindfulness training has been shown to have positive effects on
memory (e.g., Bonamo et al. 2015), it should be tested whether mindfulness training has
an impact on memory for prior remembering. To do so, researchers could implement a
brief mindfulness exercise into the retention interval between Test 1 and Test 2 and see
whether the typical impairment caused by a change in semantic context persists or is
alleviated. Researchers have argued that mindfulness training improves performance on
semantic memory tests because mindfulness increases access to a person’s network of
learned semantic associations (e.g., Heeren et al., 2009). Yet, in the present dissertation,
dispositional mindfulness was not associated with performance on a memory test
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involving semantic context. The lack of a relationship between dispositional mindfulness
and memory for prior remembering may reflect a propensity for mindful people to
behave less mindfully under experimental conditions than they do in their everyday lives.
If an experimental task requires participants to disregard their mindful tendencies (e.g.,
demanding working memory tasks like the operation span) then they may perform
differently than their trait tendencies would suggest. Mindfulness training may be used to
reinstate mindful tendencies and reduce any effects that the context of an experiment may
otherwise have on reducing trait mindfulness. That idea is supported by the findings that
mindfulness training typically improves memory performance (e.g., Bonamo, et al., 2015;
Brown et al., 2016). Therefore, participants may have their mindful tendencies
upregulated by mindfulness training and subsequently approach experimental tasks
differently. If this were the case, then mindfulness training should improve memory for
prior remembering.
The idea that mindfulness and absorption reflect different styles of internal focus
on cognition could be further elucidated using a newly developed measure of attention.
The Attentional Style Questionnaire (ASQ; Van Calster, D’Argembeau, & Majerus,
2018) was developed to assess the biases that people may have in processing internal
versus external information and whether that bias is carried out by the bottom-up or topdown attentional network. The difference between the bottom-up and top-down
attentional networks lies in whether attention is being guided by external stimulation
(bottom-up) or by volitional control (top-down). Subscales of the ASQ were designed to
measure internally-biased attention and externally-biased attention separately. The
distinction between internal and external attention is important for understanding whether
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people focus on their own thoughts and cognitions or on stimuli in the external world.
According to Van Calster et al., a bias toward an internal, bottom-up attentional style
reflects poor top-down attentional control over internal cognitions. For instance, a person
who has trouble moving on from their own intrusive thoughts is demonstrating an
inability to exert top-down cognitive control over their internal attention to intrusive
thoughts. To test my idea that mindfulness and absorption reflect differences in
internally-guided attention, scores on the ASQ could be associated with those on the
MAAS and the MODTAS. I would predict that scores on the MODTAS would be
significantly positively correlated with the internal attention subscale of the ASQ and that
scores on the MAAS would be significantly positively correlated with scores on the
external attention subscale of the ASQ. My idea that differences in internally-guided
attention have an effect on memory for prior remembering could be directly tested by
associating scores on the ASQ with memory for prior remembering.
Conclusion
In this dissertation, participants completed a three-phase memory for prior
remembering procedure (Leppanen & Lyle, 2018) in which three different types of
contextual change were made across conditions (semantic, background, location).
Participants also completed the MAAS and the MODTAS to measure individual
differences in internally-guided attention. Changes in semantic context between Test 1
and Test 2 impaired memory for prior remembering, but no impairment was found in the
background and location change conditions. I argued that differences in the association
of the contextual features to individual items could be the cause of the disparate findings.
Individual differences in absorption, as measured by the MODTAS, were found to predict
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the accuracy of memory for prior remembering of both same- and changed-context
targets, but only in the semantic change condition. No associations were found between
dispositional mindfulness, as measured by the MAAS, and any measure of memory for
prior remembering. I argued that individual differences in elaboration of cognitive
operations underlies the differential relationships between personality traits and memory
for prior remembering. In conclusion, contextual change cannot be assumed to be
inherently problematic for memory for prior remembering and that individuals who
process their cognitions more deeply may be better at later remembering those
cognitions.
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